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Municipal Bonds: In the Shadow of an Underfunded
Pension Crisis, Puerto Rico, and a Low Interest Rate
Environment
I. INTRODUCTION
With the United States stock market continuing to reach all-time
highs and multiple foreign countries’ interest rates at a negative yield, 2
many leading economists predict a recession in the coming years. 3 This
fear has caused domestic 4 and international investors 5 to search for
security and safety in their portfolio holdings. 6 Investment safety usually
comes in the form of low-yield securities. 7 These securities often include
1

1. See Stephen Grocer, Why Stocks Are Hitting Records as Economic Fears Rise: ‘There
Is
No
Alternative’,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
11,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/business/stock-market-record.html
[https://perma.cc/C8WL-MENJ] (outlining how the stock indexes such as the S&P are hitting
all-time highs, yet “there’s plenty to worry about” if a recession occurs).
2. Eshe Nelson, $12 Trillion of Negative-Yielding Bonds Are Sending a Clear Message
of Distress, QUARTZ (June 19, 2019), https://qz.com/1647791/12-trillion-of-negativeyielding-bonds-are-a-distress-signal/ [https://perma.cc/3MJQ-78CR] (explaining that
“[a]lmost $12 trillion of investment grade corporate and government bonds have negative
yields” and “half of all European government bonds have a negative yield”).
3. Jonelle Marte, 3 out of 4 Economists Predict a U.S. Recession by 2021, Survey Find,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
19,
2019,
5:40
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/19/out-economists-predict-us-recessionby-survey-finds/ [https://perma.cc/KB8U-X2H3] (“Nearly 3 out of 4 economists surveyed by
the National Association for Business Economics expect a recession by 2021, according to
poll results released . . . .”).
4. Amrith Ramkumar & Ira Iosebashvili, Investors Rush Into Havens as Growth Fears
Persist, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2019, 8:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-rushinto-havens-as-growth-fears-persist-11566207002 [https://perma.cc/GZ2B-6ZYK] (“The
shift to safer assets is the latest round in investors’ yearlong bout with fears that a global
slowdown will end the decadelong U.S. expansion.”).
5. Michael Wursthorn, There’s No Place Like U.S. in Hunt for Yield, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
29, 2019, 8:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theres-no-place-like-u-s-in-hunt-for-yield11567080003 [https://perma.cc/V3WN-Y47T] (“In a world dominated by tepid economic
growth, mediocre returns and a mountain of negative-yielding debt, foreign investors say they
see American assets as a haven . . . .”).
6. Phillip Georgiadis, Stocks Suffer Grueling Month as Investors Reach for Safety, FIN.
TIMES
(May
31,
2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/7344e9c2-8382-11e9-9935ad75bb96c849 [https://perma.cc/XN4X-LTTV].
7. See Thomas Kenny, Lowest Risk Bonds: What Types of Bonds Are the Safest?, THE
BALANCE (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/lowest-risk-bonds-what-types-ofbonds-are-the-safest-417025 [https://perma.cc/PEE8-E36E] (explaining the benefits of
different types of bonds when an investor’s “most important consideration” is protection).
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municipal bonds. 8 Municipal bond investment is meant to shield
investors from the strains of global markets and depressed economic
output. 9 However, this shield of investment safety has underlying cracks
emanating from an underfunded pension crisis in some cities and states. 10
As the fear of an economic slowdown continued to rise in 2019,
the demand for bonds skyrocketed. 11 In some cases, investors put in
orders for 5.5 times the amount of bonds a municipality was issuing. 12
The increasing demand for yield among investors allowed corporations, 13

8. See Dan Moskowitz, Are Municipal Bonds a Good Investment?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/040115/should-you-consider-munibonds.asp [https://perma.cc/S3AA-77SZ] (last updated Jan. 19, 2020) (explaining why
municipal bonds can be a preferred choice for an investor’s bond investments).
9. See Jessica Menton, Investors Pour Money into Bond Funds at a Record Pace, WALL
ST. J. (July 25, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-pour-money-intobond-funds-at-a-record-pace-11564056000 [https://perma.cc/DJD9-ETVV] (“Investors are
piling into safe-haven bonds at a record pace, a sign that caution remains despite stocks
pushing toward records.”).
10. See John Coumarianos, Opinion: Muni Bonds Aren’t Risk Free Anymore, MKT.
WATCH (Jan. 17, 2017, 8:36 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/muni-bondinvestors-left-holding-the-bag-for-pension-debacle-2017-01-16
[https://perma.cc/5XUD2YGX] (“Investors are holding the bag for troubled city and state pensions.”); The Pension
Crisis: The Case Against Municipal Bonds, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 17, 2017, 5:27 PM),
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4037438-pension-crisis-case-municipal-bonds
[https://perma.cc/BC33-KTY8] (explaining that “investors are ignoring public pension plan
liabilities” when weighing risk of municipal bonds); see also Jeffrey B. Ellman & Daniel J.
Merrett, Pensions and Chapter 9: Can Municipalities Use Bankruptcy to Solve Their Pension
Woes?, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 365, 367 (2011) (“But perhaps the single largest problem
facing municipalities today is the dramatic and growing shortfall in public pension funds.”).
11. Menton, supra note 9; see Aaron Weitzman, At this Pace, It’s ‘Impossible’ for
Issuance to Catch Up with Demand, BOND BUYER (Jan. 10, 2020, 3:14 PM),
https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/at-this-pace-its-impossible-for-issuance-to-catch-upwith-demand [https://perma.cc/W2T4-F3ZU] (“Demand for municipal bonds is actually
much stronger so far in 2020 than it was to end 2019, illustrated by record inflows into the
asset class in the latest reporting week.”).
12. See, e.g., Alexandra Scaggs, Municipal Bonds Are in High Demand and Short Supply.
Where Investors Should Look, BARRONS (June 21, 2019, 5:32 PM),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/municipal-bonds-demand-supply-51561152617
[https://perma.cc/3S3C-3MJM] (explaining in a bond sale for the East Bay Municipal Utility
District the “tallied up orders” were 5.5 times “the amount of the bonds on offer”).
13. See, e.g., Sam Goldfarb, Deere Sells 30-Year Corporate Bonds at Record Low Yields,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2019, 5:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/soft-manufacturing-datapushes-treasury-yields-lower-11567527238 [https://perma.cc/K5RQ-MB8H] (explaining
that Deere and Walt Disney have sold their corporate bonds at record low interest rates).
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universities, 14 and municipalities 15 to sell bonds earning record low
interest rates. 16 These factors have cumulatively blinded municipal bond
investors to the growing risk of cities’ and states’ underfunded pension
plans 17 that may affect their municipal investments. 18 Investors need to
consider the risk of a pension crisis among states or municipalities that
are unable to meet the obligations of their pension plans without
defaulting on their bond debt. 19
Proceeding in six parts, this Note examines the implications of
underfunded pensions and past municipal bankruptcies on the safety of
municipal bond investments and argues that investors inadequately
consider this risk when buying municipal bonds. Part II provides
background information on the municipal bond market. 20 Part III
examines the proliferation of underfunded pensions among the states and
the implications of this trend. 21 Part IV assesses the role of underfunded
pensions in undermining the safety of municipal bond investments in two
of the most significant municipal bankruptcy filings in the last two
decades. 22 Part V discusses the two states, New Jersey and Illinois, which
are currently facing sizeable underfunded pension obligations and low
14. See, e.g., Gunjan Banerji, Falling Yields Unleash Flood of Muni “Century Bonds”,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/falling-yields-unleashflood-of-muni-century-bonds-11568367003 [https://perma.cc/FFB4-FR6L] (detailing how
universities such as University of Virginia and Rutgers are capitalizing on the low rate climate
and issuing bonds at “near record lows”).
15. See, e.g., id. (“Miami-Dade County, Fla., sold almost $400 million in bonds in August
for Miami International Airport . . . swapping old debt for taxable debt . . . saved money.”).
16. See id. (“Bankers and analysts said they are expecting issuance to remain strong in
coming months.”).
17. Lina Lu et al., Reach for Yield by U.S. Public Pensions 2 (Fed. Res. Bank of Bos.,
Working
Paper
SRA
19-02,
2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019048pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6VANRQV] (“A public pension plan is underfunded if the present value of its assets is less than
the net present value of liability payments to its pension holders.”).
18. See Spencer Jakab, Prophet of Muni Market Doom Wasn’t Wrong—Just Early, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2018, 3:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/prophet-of-muni-marketdoom-wasnt-wrongjust-early-1540554098 [https://perma.cc/RQ34-XX6B] (explaining that
Meredith Whitney, who called the financial crisis of 2008, was merely early when predicting
a large number of municipality defaults in the future).
19. See, e.g., Heidi Moore, Detroit, Tip of a Vast Pensions Liability Iceberg, THE
GUARDIAN:
OPINION
(July
18,
2013,
12:11
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/18/detroit-pensions-liability-iceberg
[https://perma.cc/3VQK-N5CN] (“Detroit’s bankruptcy is, primarily, a lesson in how cities
and states cannot avoid their pension responsibilities without a backlash of biblical
proportions.”).
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part IV.
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municipal bond ratings, resembling the conditions in other bankrupt
municipalities. 23 Part VI summarizes the municipal bond market
outlook, focusing on the safety of bond investments in higher-risk
municipalities. 24
II. MUNICIPAL BONDS AND THEIR PROTECTIONS
Municipal bonds are debt securities issued by state and city
governments to fund public projects and functions. 25 The municipal bond
market began in 1812 when New York City issued a general obligation
bond to pay for digging a canal. 26 Great American achievements, such
as the Erie Canal and the Golden Gate Bridge, were funded by municipal
bond investors. 27 The municipal market began its boom in the mid-1970s
when states and cities increasingly sought alternative funding for
infrastructure and public service projects. 28 At the end of the first quarter
of 2019, there was $3.6 trillion worth of municipal bonds outstanding. 29
Municipal bonds are highly sought after because they provide
tax-free income at the federal level on the interest the bonds pay out to an
investor. 30 Moreover, if investors buy municipal bonds in their home
state, they will also avoid state and local taxes along with the federal tax
break. 31 This benefit provides an enticing option for investors who are
looking to enjoy tax-free income, especially if they are in a higher tax
bracket. 32

23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Part VI.
25. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTORS INFORMATION: MUNICIPAL BONDS,

https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/investment-products/municipalbonds [https://perma.cc/9P29-KZYB] (last visited Dec. 10, 2019).
26. Maurie Backman, Your Complete Guide to Municipal Bonds, MOTLEY FOOL (Aug.
27, 2019, 5:29 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/your-complete-guide-to-municipalbonds.aspx [https://perma.cc/5TBQ-J26W].
27. Id.
28. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and Local
Government Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and Opportunities for
Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1458 (2013).
29. Scaggs, supra note 12.
30. Rebecca Baldridge, Weighing the Tax Benefits of Municipal Securities,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/taxes/weighing-tax-benefits-of-municipalsecurities/ [https://perma.cc/ZT86-X9QT] (last updated May 30, 2018).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Types of Municipal Bonds

The two most commonly issued municipal bonds are general
obligation (“GO”) bonds and special revenue bonds. 33 When a
municipality issues a GO bond, it is typically backed by the “full faith
and credit” of the issuer. 34 GO bonds are not entitled to post-petition
interest and are treated as unsecured claims, which may be impaired
during a bankruptcy hearing. 35 When a bankruptcy court issues an
automatic stay, 36 it almost always applies to GO bondholders. 37 An
alternative type of bond, making up one-third of the municipal market, is
the special revenue bond. 38 Special revenue bonds are secured or backed
by a specific revenue stream from a public project or entity. 39 Some
revenue bonds are non-recourse, which means if the bond’s revenue
stream the bond is backed by no longer produces income, the
municipality is not required to pay the bondholders. 40
A growing trend for municipalities is to secure some GO bonds
with statutory liens that tie them to a specific sales tax. 41 These bonds
33. OFF. OF INV. EDUC. & ADVOC., INVESTOR BULLETIN: MUNICIPAL BONDS:
UNDERSTANDING
CREDIT
RISK,
SEC
Pub.
No.
134,
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/municipalbondsbulletin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5C3X7EKC] (last visited Dec. 12, 2019) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING CREDIT RISK].
34. Id.
35. HARRIET M. WELCH, JORDAN A. KROOP & SHERRI L DAHL, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS,
CLIENT ALERT: MUNICIPAL RESTRUCTURING SOLUTIONS: DETROIT AND BEYOND 20 (2013),
https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/~/media/files/insights/events/2013/08/municipalrestructuring-solutions—detroit-and-b__/files/presentation
powerpoint/fileattachment/municipalrestructuringsolutionsdetroitandbeyond.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H5Q2-5C6Z].
36. The automatic stay applied in Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings stops all collection
actions against the debtor and its property upon the filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 922(a)
(2018).
37. WELCH, KROOP & DAHL, supra note 35.
38. Jane Sasseen, How Puerto Rico’s Financial Storms Washing Over the Mainland,
QUARTZ (Mar. 8, 2019), https://qz.com/1557486/puerto-ricos-bond-saga-is-messing-upmainland-municipal-markets/#site-content [https://perma.cc/N6QP-L65L] (Adam Stern, cohead of research at bond market specialists Breckinridge Capital Advisors, “estimates that
special revenue bonds now make up around a third of the $3.8 trillion municipal bond market
in the U.S”).
39. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 25; 11 U.S.C. § 902(2).
40. UNDERSTANDING CREDIT RISK, supra note 33.
41. See, e.g., Karen Pierog, Chicago Mayor Eyes Big Bond Refunding to Save $200
Million for Budget, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2019, 5:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uschicago-bonds/chicago-mayor-eyes-big-bond-refunding-to-save-200-million-for-budgetidUSKBN1X02CC [https://perma.cc/7KR7-2AFY] (explaining Chicago—in an attempt to
balance its great deficit—issued subordinate lien bonds that gave investors a statutory lien on
the city’s sales tax in order to receive an investment-grade rating).
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allow the municipality to back the bonds with a statutory requirement
paid out directly from the annual budget. 42 GO bonds that are backed by
statutory liens may be treated as secured claims and therefore are not cut
off from post-petition interest. 43 A municipality will issue GO bonds
with higher protections to receive a better bond rating and, in turn, a lower
interest rate because of the safety the statutory lien gives to the
bondholder. 44 The trend of issuing bonds with enhanced protections may
seem to be in the bondholders’ interest, but it can indicate a
municipality’s poor financial condition since the municipality gives up
dedicated tax revenue streams. 45
B.

Default Rate and Bond Ownership

The apparent safety of municipal bonds for investors is wrapped
up in the historically low default rate. 46 The municipality default rate of
investment-grade bonds 47 has consistently held at 0.8%. 48 Non-

42. See NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND HOLDERS, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: STATE LAW,
BANKRUPTCY
AND
DISCLOSURE
CONSIDERATIONS
3,
https://www.nfma.org/assets/documents/other.orgs/nabl.gobonds.8.14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FYR3-D6XF] (last visited Dec. 12, 2020) (stating GO bonds can carry “an
affirmative statutory requirement to provide for maturing debt service in the annual budget”).
43. Id. at iii.
44. See NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND HOLDERS, GENERAL OBLIGATION BOND PAYMENTS:
STATUTORY
LIENS
AND
RELATED
DISCLOSURES
8
(Dec.
2017),
https://www.nfma.org/assets/documents/RBP/wp_statliens_final_dec2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9Z83-HAAW] (“The presence of a statutory lien influences the decisions
of the various market participants, and is particularly important in the case of obligors with
weaker credit profiles or an increased risk of defaulting or entering into bankruptcy.”).
45. See, e.g., Martin Z. Braun, Once-Safest Muni Bonds Tainted as Investors Await
(June
20,
2018,
8:28
AM),
Downgrades,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-20/once-safest-muni-bonds-tarnishedas-investors-await-downgrades [https://perma.cc/FLF7-NG8K] (explaining that Illinois
issuance of sales tax bonds continue to take a hit due to the state’s financial health); see also
Chung, supra note 28, at 1482 (“Municipal securities issuers also depend upon different, and
less elastic, sources of funds for debt repayment.”).
46. See Chung, supra note 28, at 1460–61 (“Municipal securities are marketed to
investors as ‘widow and orphan’ securities—i.e., safe for vulnerable and risk averse
investors—because state and local government issuers rarely default or obtain discharge.”).
47. James
Chen,
Investment
Grade,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/investmentgrade.asp [https://perma.cc/FNC5-5P7Q]
(last updated July 15, 2019) (explaining investment grade bonds are rated as low as BBB- or
Baa and indicate a lower risk of credit default).
48. Thomas Kenny, The Risk of Municipal Bonds, THE BALANCE (June 25, 2019),
https://www.thebalance.com/the-risks-of-municipal-bonds-417146 [https://perma.cc/8SZZZM4Q].
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investment grade 49 municipal bonds have had a default rate of
approximately 7.94%. 50 Although the default rates are low, they do not
accurately reflect the market risk and health of municipalities. 51 Many
cities cannot file for bankruptcy without permission 52 and, if available,
can only seek Chapter 9 53 bankruptcy to restructure debts. 54 This
inability to restructure debt outside of bankruptcy has skewed the default
rate positively without taking into account the inner workings of a state’s
attempt to illustrate health by shifting the burden of bond repayment to
the taxpayers in order to maintain the status quo and investment-grade
ratings of the state’s respective bonds. 55
Municipal bonds are owned by households, nonprofit
organizations, mutual and closed-end funds, banks, broker-dealers, and
exchange-traded funds. 56 Households and nonprofits hold the most
exposure to municipal bonds, with most citizens buying their state
municipal bonds because of the bonds’ tax exempt status. 57 Mutual funds
carry the second-largest exposure to municipal bonds, followed by banks
in third. 58 Therefore, any municipal bond default will likely have an
impact across financial sectors. 59
49. What
does
Investment
Grade
Mean?,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/what-does-investment-grade-mean/
[https://perma.cc/N8V7-YL23] (last updated May 16, 2019) (explaining that non-investment
grade bonds are risky assets and the probability of the issuer repaying the debt is
“speculative”).
50. Kenny, supra note 48 (“From 1970-2011, 7.94% of below-investment-grade
municipal bonds defaulted.”).
51. Chung, supra note 28, at 1461–62.
52. See
Municipal
Bankruptcy
State
Laws,
GOVERNING,
https://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-municipal-bankruptcy-laws-policies-map.html
[https://perma.cc/E5HR-JMSJ] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (outlining the various bankruptcy
laws among the states); Vaneeta Chintamaneni, The Unraveling of an American City:
Pensions, Municipal Debt, and Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 22 ELDER L.J. 523, 539–40 (2015) (“In
1994, Congress amended Chapter 9 so that eligibility for Chapter 9 was required to be
‘specifically authorized,’ which means that states must explicitly permit Chapter 9 bankruptcy
for cities to be eligible.”).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 902 (2018).
54. See Chintamaneni, supra note 52, at 539–40. (explaining municipalities are only
allowed to file for chapter 9 bankruptcy, no other form of restructuring is available).
55. See Chung, supra note 28, at 1462. (“[Municipal bond] default risk does not tell the
whole story for issuers and taxpayers, because it does not capture risks and costs that issuers
and taxpayers incur to keep default and discharge rates low.”).
56. MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., TRENDS IN MUNICIPAL BOND OWNERSHIP 1–2 (2018),
http://www.msrb.org/msrb1/pdfs/MSRB-Brief-Trends-Bond-Ownership.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5JUA-ZH34].
57. Id.; see Baldridge, supra note 30 (explaining tax-benefits of municipal bonds).
58. MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., supra note 56, at 2.
59. See id. (showing the various stakeholders of municipal bonds).
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Changing Landscape for Banks’ Municipal Bond Ownership

In the current low interest rate environment, 60 some banks are
preparing for the possibility that United States’ Federal Reserve interest
rate will reach zero. 61 President Donald J. Trump is a proponent of a
zero-rate. 62 This forces banks to find substitute sources of revenue to
compensate for the smaller interest they receive on loans. 63 Many banks
are turning to non-interest dependent fees such as ATM fees, overcharge
fees, and monthly service fees to provide a more stable source of
income. 64
These fees, along with others, could alienate some
customers. 65 Municipal bonds can provide an alternative source of
income and healthy returns to banks with limited risk, especially in light
of an amendment to liquidity rules. 66
On August 22, 2018, the three Federal Banking agencies—The
Office of Comptroller of Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the

60. James Chen, Low Interest Rate Environment Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/low-interest-rate-environment.asp
[https://perma.cc/8MRJ-YMZN] (last updated Apr. 26, 2019) (“A low interest rate
environment occurs when the risk-free rate of interest, typically set by a central bank, is lower
than the historic average for a prolonged period of time. In the United States, the risk-free rate
is generally defined by the interest rate on Treasury securities.”).
61. See, e.g., David Benoit, JPMorgan CEO Dimon Raises Specter of Zero Rates, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2019, 4:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/jpmorgan-ceo-dimon-raisesspecter-of-zero-rates-11568147683 [https://perma.cc/K49D-95SD] (“The biggest bank in the
U.S. [JPMorgan] is starting to prepare how to make money if interest rates in the U.S. drop to
zero . . . Low interest rates squeeze margins banks make on loans. Hitting zero or negative
rates raises complex questions about how to charge customers for loans and still make
money.”).
62. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 11, 2019, 3:42 AM)
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1171735691769929728 [https://perma.cc/XC8629CY] (“The Federal Reserve should get our interest rates down to ZERO, or less, and we
should then start to refinance our debt . . . .”).
63. See Irina Ivanova, Bank Fees Around the U.S. Climb to Record Highs, CBS (Oct. 2,
2019, 6:03 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bank-fees-hit-a-record-high-this-year2019/ [https://perma.cc/V5YT-76UQ] (“And now that the Fed is lowering interest rates,
which affects how much profit banks can make on loans, banks are likely to try adding or
raising their fees . . . .”).
64. Id.
65. See Benoit, supra note 61 (“Banks would also have to grapple with whether to charge
customers for their deposits without alienating them, a dynamic U.S. consumers and
businesses haven’t yet dealt with.”).
66. See James A. Klotz, Reversal on Banks Rules a Win for Muni Bonds, FMSBONDS
(May 25, 2018), https://www.fmsbonds.com/news-and-perspectives/reversal-on-bank-rulesa-win-for-muni-bonds/ [https://perma.cc/6WZW-C73Y] (explaining that the new HQLAs
rule makes municipal bonds an attractive option for banks).
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—jointly adopted a rule 67 that
amends the agencies respective liquidity coverage ratio (“LCR”) 68
applied to banks, and will now treat any municipal bond that is both (1)
“liquid and readily marketable” 69 and (2) “investment grade” 70 as level
2B high-quality liquid assets (“HQLAs”). 71 The initial rule, which
became effective on January 1, 2015, did not consider municipal bonds
liquid. 72 The amended rule will allow municipal bonds, as now Level 2B
assets, to be discounted at a 50% rate when calculating LCR, meaning if
a bank holds $100 in municipal bonds that meet the two-prong criteria,
then $50 counts towards the LCR ratio. 73 This regulatory change has
made the proper use of municipal bonds an attractive option for safe,
partially-liquid income, netting higher interest rates compared to
treasuries. 74
A problem for banks could arise in their lower-rated municipal
bond holdings, as there are multiple recent examples of banks’
purchasing bonds from low-rated municipal issuers—Illinois and

67. Liquidity Coverage Ratio Rule: Treatment of Certain Municipal Obligations as HighQuality Liquid Assets, 84 Fed. Reg. 25976 (July 5, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 329,
12
C.F.R.
pt.
249,
12
C.F.R.
pt.
50).
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/06/05/2019-11715/liquidity-coverageratio-rule-treatment-of-certain-municipal-obligations-as-high-quality-liquid
[https://perma.cc/W4FC-5X32].
68. The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) “refers to the proportion of highly liquid assets
held by financial institutions, to ensure their ongoing ability to meet short-term obligations.
This ratio is essentially a generic stress test that aims to anticipate market-wide shocks and
make sure that financial institutions possess suitable capital preservation, to ride out any shortterm liquidity disruptions, that may plague the market.” Chris B. Murphy, Liquid Coverage
Ratio, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidity-coverage-ratio.asp
[https://perma.cc/Y2Q9-KXUP] (last updated Dec. 12, 2019).
69. Liquid and readily-marketable means “that the security is traded in an active
secondary market with: (1) more than two committed market makers; (2) a large number of
non-market maker participants on both the buying and selling sides of transactions; (3) timely
and observable market prices; and (4) a high trading volume.” 12 C.F.R § 249.3 (2018).
70. Investment grade means “the issuer of a security has an adequate capacity to meet
financial commitments under the security for the projected life of the asset or exposure. An
issuer has an adequate capacity to meet financial commitments if the risk of default by the
obligor is low and the full and timely repayment of principal and interest is expected.” § 1.2(d)
71. Liquidity Coverage Ratio Rule: Treatment of Certain Municipal Obligations as HighQuality Liquid Assets (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 329, 12 C.F.R. pt. 249, 12 C.F.R. pt.
50).
72. Klotz, supra note 66.
73. See 12 C.F.R. Part 249.21(b)(3) (2018) (“The level 2B liquid asset amount equals 50
percent of the fair value of all level 2B liquid assets held by the Board-regulated institution as
of the calculation date that are eligible HQLA.”).
74. Klotz, supra note 66.
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Chicago—in large quantities. 75 These bonds were rated a notch or two
above investment-grade. 76 Banks should weigh the risk of downgrade
carefully if the purchase of these bonds are for liquidity purposes because
low-rated bonds would likely no longer be eligible as HQLAs if
downgraded below “investment grade” status. 77
Despite the August 2018 beneficial rule for municipal bond
ownership, the corporate tax cut in early 2018 78 combined with the new
accounting standard, 79 have decreased banks’ appetite and holdings of
municipal bonds sharply. 80 As of the third quarter of 2019, banks’

75. Karen Pierog, Investors Grab Hefty Yields in Illinois and Chicago Bond
Sales, REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2019, 6:11 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/illinoisbonds/investors-grab-hefty-yields-in-illinois-and-chicago-bond-sales-idUSL1N21D1PF
[https://perma.cc/G6QW-LMMT] [hereinafter Illinois & Chicago Bond Sale] (explaining in
March 2019, Illinois and its struggling City of Chicago issued over 1.1 billion of GO bonds
and Chicago’s issuance made up $770 million of the total; Bank of America “beat out eight
other bidders for $300 million of taxable bonds and 13 other bidders for $140 million of taxexempt bonds.”); Karen Pierog, Illinois’ Municipal Market Penalty Eases in $750 Million
Bond Sale, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/illinoisbonds/investors-grab-hefty-yields-in-illinois-and-chicago-bond-sales-idUSL1N21D1PF
[https://perma.cc/ZPD3-FC96] [hereinafter Illinois Bond Sale] (explaining in November
2019, Illinois issued $750 million of GO bonds. Despite Illinois “lowest credit rating
compared to any other state,” and Bank of America bought $450 million of the bonds and
Barclays Capital bought $350 million).
76. Illinois & Chicago Bond Sale supra note 75; Illinois Bond Sale, supra note 75.
77. See 12 C.F.R. § 1.2(d) (2018) (explaining the requirements for investment grade
securities).
78. The federal corporate tax cut of 2018 made banks less in need of the tax-saving
benefits of municipal bonds, causing banks to “slash their exposure” of the less attractive
securities. Michelle Kaske, Biggest U.S. Banks Slash Muni-Bond Holdings After Tax Cut,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201808-27/biggest-u-s-banks-slash-muni-bond-holdings-after-tax-rate-cut
[https://perma.cc/8GTK-JDKA].
79. FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE, DERIVATIVES AND HEDGING 184 (August
2017), https://asc.fasb.org/imageRoot/38/112270638.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GW4-2NV5];
see Tom Kozlik, Has Bank Municipal Bond Activity Been Affected by the New Hedge
Accounting Rules?, PNC (May 23, 2018), https://www.riverarchcap.com/content/dam/pnccom/pdf/corporateandinstitutional/MunicipalBond/bank-municipal-bond-5-23-18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AG3Q-24FJ] (explaining the new accounting standard implemented in
2018 allowed banks to reclassify held to maturity securities (municipal bonds) to availablefor-sale). Banks can use these new rules to move some of its municipal holdings to their
available-for-sale category and then sell off more risky debt. Kozlik, supra.
80. FED. RES. BD. FIN. ACCT. OF THE U.S.
(Dec. 12, 2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20191212/html/l212.htm
[https://perma.cc/3ARR-KGJX] (showing steady decrease of banks’ municipal holdings).
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municipal bond ownership continued its decline from its high of $572.6
billion to $469.8 billion. 81
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III. THE UNDERFUNDED PENSION CRISIS, “ACHILLES HEEL” FOR BOND
HOLDERS
States’ underfunded pension liabilities will likely eventually lead
to some municipal defaults without intervention. 83 In 2017, there was a
$1.28 trillion funding gap in pensions. 84 On a market basis, the total
pension debt in the U.S. is over $5 trillion. 85 A healthy pension fund
81. Id.
82. Data derived from the Federal Reserve as of the third quarter of 2019. Id.
83. See Greg Mennis, Susan Banta, & David Draine, Assessing the Risk of Fiscal Distress

for Public Pensions: State Stress Test Analysis 1 (M-RCBG Associate Working Paper Series
No.
9,
2018),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/AWP_92_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GE6L-8LSN] (concluding that public pensions “may be more vulnerable to
an economic downturn than they have ever been” and “states like New Jersey and Kentucky,
which are severely underfunded, are at high risk of insolvency”).
84. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE STATE PENSION FUNDING GAP: 2017 2 (June 2019),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2019/06/statepensionfundinggap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CD5G-JSGJ] [hereinafter PENSION FUNDING GAP].
85. PENSION TRACKER, STAN. INST. FOR ECON. POL’Y. RES., https://us.pensiontracker.org/
[https://perma.cc/V5BC-Z63R] (last visited on Jan. 6, 2020); see Chuck DeVore, 5.2 Trillion
of Government Pension Debt Threatens to Overwhelm State Budgets, Taxpayers, FORBES
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should be maintained at a funded ratio of at least 80%. 86 In states such
as Illinois and New Jersey, however, the pension accounts cover
approximately 35% of outstanding pension obligations. 87 Pension plan
funding methods help to explain this low ratio. 88
A.

Pension Funding

Public employer pension plans for state and local government
workers cover approximately 21 million full and part-time workers. 89
State and local governments sponsor more than 55,000 pension plans
state employees are enrolled in. 90 These plans are funded by the
employee over his career and by the city or state as administrator of the
pension. 91 The pension fund itself is considered an unfunded pension
plan because it relies on a continuous stream of revenue from its state or
local government sponsor. 92 This form of funding allows the employee’s
contributions to go into a single source that makes investments, the
earnings from which pay benefits to the employee when he or she
retires. 93 The pensions are funded primarily by investment returns, 94 with
employer and employee contributions making up less than one-third of
(May 31, 2019, 3:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckdevore/2019/05/31/5-2trillion-of-government-pension-debt-threatens-to-overwhelm-state-budgetstaxpayers/#49c0e767759d [https://perma.cc/U67S-8U5H] (explaining how $5 trillion of
pension debt will have negative consequences on state budgets).
86. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 368–69 (“Public pension plans typically are
considered to be adequately funded at the 80% level because, ironically enough, public
employers are assumed to be more financially stable than private corporations.”); see, e.g.,
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 08-983T, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PENSION
PLANS: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND FUNDED STATUS 18 (2008) (applying a 80% funded ratio
when determining if a pension fund is healthy).
87. See PENSION FUNDING GAP, supra note 84, at 16–17.
88. Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369.
89. URBAN
INSTITUTE,
STATE
AND
LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
PENSION,
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-financeinitiative/projects/state-and-local-backgrounders/state-and-local-government-pensions
[https://perma.cc/U8JB-WPNU] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
90. Id.
91. AM. ASS’N OF RETIRED PERSONS, PENSION CONTRIBUTION REQUIREMENTS 2,
https://assets.aarp.org/www.aarp.org_/articles/work/contribution-requirements.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DVT-URA9] [hereinafter PENSION REQUIREMENTS] (last visited Jan. 22,
2020).
92. Julia
Kagan,
Unfunded
Pension
Plan,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unfunded-pension-plan.asp [https://perma.cc/54JT77J5] (last updated July 28, 2019).
93. PENSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 91, at 2.
94. Id. (explaining investments make up approximately 68% of contributions towards a
pension fund.).
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the combined total. 95 Therefore, pension funds rely on a healthy market
to meet their obligations to retirees. 96
At least once every two years, 97 actuaries calculate the total cost
needed to sustain the pension in full or the Annual Required
Contributions (“ARC”). 98 The ARC is composed of many factors, with
the most influential being the assumed rate of return. 99 The assumed rate
of return is the rate at which the fund expects to earn on its investments
during the year. 100 Unlike corporate pension plans regulated by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), there is no
regulator for state and local government plans; 101 therefore, there is
generally no federal legal obligation for the state to make the
contributions set by the actuary unless required by state and local law or
mandate. 102 For this reason, the state may have no obligation to make up
95. Id.
96. Heather Gillers, The Risk Pension Funds Can’t Escape, WALL. ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2018,

8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/public-pensions-are-still-betting-more-than-half-ofall-assets-on-stocks-1519131600
[https://perma.cc/PN89-JWYT]
(explaining
the
“vulnerability” of pensions is from the “significant risk from one basic investment: stocks”).
97. Statement No. 27 of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board NO. 116-C 1, 4,
paragraph 9 (Nov. 1994), https://www.gasb.org/resources/ccurl/44/286/GASBS-27.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9HFC-DSDG] (“[The Government Accounting Standards Board mandates]
for financial reporting purposes, an actuarial valuation should be performed at least
biennially.”).
98. Id. at 4, fn. 5 (“[The ARC] is based on a projection of covered payroll for the period
to which the ARC will apply. Some employers make contributions based on projected covered
payroll; others contribute based on budgeted or actual covered payroll for the year. Any of
those measures of covered payroll, consistently applied, is acceptable for calculating annual
pension cost and the NPO [net pension obligation], if any.”); see also PENSION
REQUIREMENTS, supra note 91, at 2 (“These actuaries calculate the cost associated with new
benefits earned in that year (also called the “normal cost”) plus any additional amount that
might be required to make up for shortfalls that have developed in the past.”); see generally
Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 374–75 (“Unlike the strict accounting rules of privatepension plans, established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), GASB is
much more flexible.”).
99. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369 (“These funding shortfalls are further
compounded in many cases by the unrealistically optimistic assumptions used to calculate
funding status in the first place.”).
100. PENSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 91, at 2.
101. Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 373 (2011) (“Neither ERISA nor the PBGC have
any role in the creation, administration, modification, enforcement, or termination of public
pension plans.”); see Chung, supra note 28, at 1486 (“The regulatory and financial reporting
regimes applicable to municipal securities issuers and municipal securities offerings also
make the market less transparent, and more opaque in terms of risk, compared to other market
segments.”).
102. See, e.g., Yvette Shields, Funded Ratios Erode for Downstate and Suburban Illinois
BUYER
(Aug.
6,
2019,
3:03
PM),
Pension
Funds,
BOND
https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/funded-ratios-for-downstate-and-suburban-illinoispension-funds-erode [https://perma.cc/QHV8-L9G5] (explaining Illinois has a state mandate
to reach a 90% funded ratio within the next few years).
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the difference when pension contributions fall short of meeting the
funding needs. 103 Pensions become unhealthily underfunded in two
ways: (1) when the plan sponsor does not contribute the ARC amount or
(2) when the assumed rate of return ends up being above the actual
investment return causing a shortfall regardless of the contribution. 104
Regarding the first way, during the 2008 recession, pension assets
fell from $3.2 trillion to $2.3 trillion. 105 Since 2008, the majority of states
and local governments have fallen short in making their ARC payments
to their pension funds, causing remaining obligations for each year to turn
into liabilities. 106 Regarding the second way, the overestimation of the
assumed rate of return is broadly scrutinized by scholars and market
participants. 107 Pension funds may overestimate their assumed rate of
return to allow the state or city to make lower contributions in a given
year. 108
The funds also use a discount rate 109 equal to the assumed rate of
return when calculating the total underfunded status. 110 Therefore, the
103. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 373 (“[F]ederal law generally does not
require municipal governments to maintain the funding or report on the funded status of their
pension plans.”).
104. See PENSION FUNDING GAP, supra note 84, at 16–17 (explaining ways pension funds
begin to become underfunded).
105. PENSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 91, at 3.
106. Id.
107. See CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, THE CASE FOR NEW
PENSION
ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS
12,
(May
2019),
https://www.ncpers.org/files/The%20Case%20for%20New%20Pension%20Accounting%20
Standards_May%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GQZ-XCPW] (“Though there are many
finance officers and city council members across the country who have complaints to make
about Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) rules, most of these complaints
have to do with the issue of funding levels and assumed rates of return.”).
108. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369 (“These funding shortfalls are further
compounded in many cases by the unrealistically optimistic assumptions used to calculate
funding status in the first place.”); Chintamaneni, supra note 52, at 528 (“In addition, in recent
decades municipalities used overly optimistic projections for rates of return and economic
forecasts.”).
109. Discount Rate is the “valuation method used to estimate the value of an investment
based on its expected future cash flows, [and] the viability of a project or an investment by
calculating the present value of expected future cash flows using a discount rate.” Jim
Chappelow,
Discount
Rate,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/discountrate.asp
[https://perma.cc/TNY7-VHSH]
(last updated Jan. 29, 2020).
110. See Jamie Lenney, Bryan Lutz, & Louise Sheiner, The Sustainability of State and
Local Government Pensions: A Public Finance Approach 5 (July 14, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/07/lenney_lutz_sheiner_MFC_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VCU9YFAZ] (“State and local governments have typically chosen to use a discount rate equal to
the assumed rate of return on risky plan assets.”).
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pension funds are assuming the investment return for the year, typically
7–8%, will continue indefinitely, going against standard financial
principles that use a risk-free rate of return. 111 Using the assumed rate of
return as the discount rate causes the plan’s overall health to appear better
on paper by lowering its total expected liabilities 112 even while many
plans continuously fail to meet their set assumed rate of return. 113 In
2019, pension plans expected an average return of 7.25% from their
investments, 114 but some realized at least half a percentage point less.115
Even when pensions met their assumed rate of returns, many funds’
liabilities continued to grow. 116
When pension funds begin to lower their assumed rate of return,
which in practice equals their discount rate, 117 the health of the pension
111. See id. (“[S]tandard financial principles of valuation suggest that a stream of future
payments should be discounted at a rate which reflects the probability that the payments will
be honored (i.e. at a rate reflecting the riskiness of future stream of payment.”); REPORT OF
THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE 16 (St. Budget Crisis Task Force January 2014),
https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/state_budget_crisis_task_for
ce.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D7L-RT6V] (“Economists and financial analysts generally
discount future payments using rates that reflect the risk associated with the promised
payments, relative to the broader market. Since most public pension benefits have strong legal
protections, the appropriate discount rates should be comparable to other low risk assets.”).
112. See Lenney, Lutz & Sheiner, supra note 110 at 5 (“With lower discount rates, pension
debt is typically much larger than stated in annual government accounting statements and
most plans are far from being fully pre-funded – i.e. assets are well below the present value
of future benefit payments.”); Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369 (“If more realistic (or
at least more conservative) discount rates are used, the underfunding of public-pension plans
becomes even more pronounced.”).
113. See, e.g., Rob Kozlowski, Chicago Policeman Fund Returns 4.5% for Fiscal Year,
PENSIONS & INVS. (Oct. 3, 2019, 12:02 PM), https://www.pionline.com/pensionfunds/chicago-policemen-fund-returns-45-fiscal-year
[https://perma.cc/3R9N-NGJJ]
(explaining that in 2019 the police fund in Illinois fund fell short of its “policy benchmark
returns of 6.1%” only gaining 4.5% on investment returns).
114. Amit Sinha, Low Interest Rates are Compounding the Big Problems Facing Pension
Funds, MKT. WATCH (Sept. 3, 2019, 9:16 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/lowinterest-rates-are-compounding-the-big-problems-facing-pension-funds-2019-08-30
[https://perma.cc/THA4-6Q9D].
115. See Liz Farme, Amid Concerns of Recession, Pension Plan Returns Fall Short,
GOVERNING (Aug. 16, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.governing.com/week-in-finance/govpension-plan-returns-falling-short-expectations.html [https://perma.cc/S7B5-AKBN] (“Plans
with more than $1 billion in assets earned a median return of 6.79 percent for the fiscal year
ending June 30, according to the firm Wilshire Trust Universe Comparison Service.”).
116. See Heather Gillers, The Long Bull Market Has Failed to Fix Public Pensions, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-longest-u-s-bullmarket-has-failed-to-fix-the-nations-public-pensions-115548886
[https://perma.cc/E963TC6C] (explaining the benefit of the “10-year-long-bull market” has failed to fix the
underlying issues of pension funds).
117. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Saret, Barbara Zhan & Subhadeep Mitra, Investment Return
Assumptions of Public Pension Funds, PENSIONS & INVS. (Mar. 23, 2017, 1:00 AM),
https://www.pionline.com/article/20170323/ONLINE/170319953/investment-return-
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fund dims. 118 Each tenth of a percentage point decrease in the assumed
rate of return causes an estimated 1–1.5% increase in the total pension
obligation, 119 thereby increasing the difference municipalities must
reconcile each year. 120 A municipality or state will commonly use two
strategies to make up for underfunding in a pension plan: (1) issue more
debt to cover the hole, or (2) increase its contributions through its taxing
power. 121
Under the first strategy, some states have turned to a new form of
bond, pension obligation bonds (“POBs”), to make up for inadequate
contributions or investment returns. 122 States issue POBs to shore up
underfunded pension obligations, issuing municipal bonds under the
belief that investment returns on the borrowed money will outpace the
fixed interest rate on the bond payments. 123 POB issuance has preceded
the bankruptcies of Stockton, California; San Bernardino, California; and
Puerto Rico. 124 Many experts disfavor this type of issuance, arguing that
assumptions-of-public-pension-funds [https://perma.cc/6749-EEMR] (“The $311 billion
California Public Employees’ Retirement System saw its funded status fall four percentage
points to 69% and reduced its assumed investment rate of return to 7% from 7.5%.”).
118. See, e.g., Samantha Marcus, N.J. Is Facing a $1.2B Public-Worker Pension Time
Bomb, NJ.COM (Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.nj.com/politics/2019/09/nj-is-facing-a-12bpublic-worker-pension-time-bomb.html [https://perma.cc/4ZW6-Y5DS] (explaining after
Chris Christie tweaked the pension assumed rate of return by half a point the state’s actuarially
recommended pension contribution increased by 390.3 million).
119. Clive Lipshitz & Ingo Walter, Commentary: A Roadmap for Preventing U.S. Public
Pension Funds from Becoming a Taxpayer Burden, PENSIONS & INVS. (Aug. 5, 2019, 12:00
AM),
https://www.pionline.com/industry-voices/commentary-roadmap-preventing-uspublic-pension-funds-becoming-taxpayer-burden [https://perma.cc/8V4A-QR6Y].
120. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 118 (showing that when the assumed rate of return
lowers, as it did in New Jersey, for the pension plan, the obligations for the state or local
government sponsor increases).
121. See Brian Chappatta, Pension Obligation Bonds May Soon Have Their Moment,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 10, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-1010/pension-obligation-bonds-may-soon-have-their-moment [https://perma.cc/ZX9D-5NPT]
(predicting pension obligation bonds will likely be used in the future as an alternative to
increasing contributions).
122. Sarah Breitenbach, Despite Risks, State and Local Governments Turn to Pension
Obligation Bonds, PEW (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2015/08/12/despite-risks-state-and-local-governments-turn-topension-obligation-bonds [https://perma.cc/Z34Q-H373].
123. Id.
124. See Erick Schulzke, Pension Obligation Bonds: Risky Gimmick or Smart
Investment?, GOVERNING (Jan. 2013), https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/govpension-obligation-bonds-risky-or-smart.html [https://perma.cc/AG9Q-VT5C] (“The bonds
took on some notoriety this past summer when two California cities, Stockton and San
Bernardino, went bankrupt.”); see also Marc Joffe, Local Governments Beware: Pension
Obligation Bonds Are a Risky Response to Rising CALPERS Bills, REASON FOUND. (Dec. 12,
2018),
https://reason.org/commentary/pension-obligation-bonds-are-a-risky-response-torising-calpers-bills/ [[https://perma.cc/WJ6B-5WSR] (“Indeed, issuers could be in for a
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municipalities’ assumed investment return rates typically do not exceed
the cost of paying back the loan, 125 and the issuance itself reflects the
negative health of the issuer. 126 Despite their unsafe nature, distressed
municipalities continue to issue POBs to willing buyers. 127
Under the second strategy, state and local governments typically
increase the tax burden of their citizens to help maintain pension
funding. 128 Usually, there is only so much a tax base can sustain before
a state or city sees citizens leaving at a higher rate than moving in. 129 One
repeat of the fiasco that befell Puerto Rico, which issued POBs at the beginning of the 2008
crash—a move that contributed to the commonwealth’s bankruptcy.”).
125. See Schulzke, supra note 124 (“Over the years, returns on POBs have often fallen
below the interest rate the state or locality paid to borrow the money, digging the liability hole
even deeper.”); GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N, Pension Obligation Bonds (Jan. 2015),
https://www.gfoa.org/pension-obligation-bonds
[https://perma.cc/Y33X-8K63]
(“The
Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) recommends that state and local
governments do not issue POBs.”).
126. See Alicia Munnell, Jean Puererr Aubry & Mark Cafarelli, An Update on Pension
Obligation Bonds, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH BOS. C. (July 2014),
https://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/slp_40.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9GX-6JSQ]
(“The results show that governments are more likely to issue POBs if the plan represents a
substantial obligation to the government, they have substantial debt outstanding, and they are
short of cash . . . financial pressures play a major role.”); Alicia Munnell, Be Wary of Pension
Obligation
Bonds,
MKT.
WATCH
(Apr.
15,
2015,
6:01
AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/be-wary-of-pension-obligation-bonds-2015-04-15
[https://perma.cc/HFK4-7J7J] (“Despite the risks, the data show that the issuance of a POB is
driven not by careful planning among well-funded plans or by restructuring for sustainability
among underfunded plans but rather by great financial stress among plans that have not been
paying their pension bills.”).
127. See Keeley Webster, Pension Bonds Are Staging a Comeback in California, BOND
BUYER (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/pension-bonds-are-staging-acomeback-in-california [https://perma.cc/6AHP-T3QS] (explaining low interest rates have
caused a “new influx” of POB issuance, with hundreds of millions issued by California
municipalities since 2007).
128. See, e.g., Elizabeth Campbell, Chicago Seeks Tax Hike to Avert Insolvency for
Pension
Fund,
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
3,
2016,
1:34
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-03/chicago-seeks-tax-hike-to-avertinsolvency-for-largest-pension [https://perma.cc/M4H8-JKUE] (explaining Chicago is using
tax hikes in utilities to try to keep the city’s largest pension fund from insolvency).
129. See, e.g., Kate Linebaugh, Detroit’s Population Crashes, WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 23,
2011,
12:01
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704461304576216850733151470
[https://perma.cc/E3MZ-HN8D] (explaining Detroit’s population declined by 25% in the
years before its bankruptcy); Shawn M. Carter, People are Fleeing from New Jersey More
Than Any Other State,” CNBC (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/11/whypeople-are-fleeing-new-jersey-more-than-any-other-state.html
[https://perma.cc/YB5MVWX] (“New Jersey became the No. 1 state to move away from in 2018, according to new
data from moving and relocation company United Vans Lines.”); Matt Vasilogambros, Why
Are Residents Leaving in Illinois in Droves, GOVERNING (June 19, 2019, 8:39 AM),
https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/sl-illinois-sees-population-decline.html
[https://perma.cc/H59R-URHW] (“Illinois’ population has declined by 157,000 residents
over the past five years, making it one of only two states — West Virginia is the other — to
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of the most common taxes is a property tax, because it is easy for a
governor to place. 130 However, it can have a stifling effect on the housing
market in the respective area. 131
B.

Pensions’ Investment Concerns

Concerns about the risky investment portfolios of pensions that
rely heavily on alternative investments have spanned at least two
decades. 132 In the early 2000s, pensions poured large amounts of money
into hedge funds. 133 In 2001, the Securities Exchange Commission
issued a speech warning stating that pension plans’ movement into hedge
funds, presents many reasons to be cautious. 134 These investment
concerns dealing with hedge fund investment included conflict of
interest, 135 lack of regulation, 136 and lack of transparency. 137
lose people over the past decade.”); see also Elizabeth S. Goldman & Stewart E. Sterk, The
Impact of Law on the State Pension Crisis, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 115 (2019)
(“Because the population is mobile, a state whose tax burden becomes high relative to that of
its neighbors risks losing those taxpayers in the best position to shoulder that burden.”).
130. See Greg Hinz, Pensions Sucking Up Half of Property Tax Hikes, CHI. BUS. (July 31,
2008,
7:00
AM),
https://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20180731/BLOGS02/180739969/pensionssoaking-up-half-of-property-tax-hikes [https://perma.cc/7GXA-DDHW] (“[T]he cost of
worker pensions is soaking up a larger and larger share of your property taxes, on average 45
cents of every extra dollar levied by school districts, city halls and other local government
statewide between 1996 and 2016.”).
131. See, e.g., A.K. Thompson, Property Taxes Stunt Chicago’s House Price Growth, FIN.
TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/e579e7a2-9d88-11e9-9c06-a4640c9feebb
[https://perma.cc/M52L-C3WA] (“[A]gents and brokers say the seemingly relentless increase
in Chicago’s property taxes in recent years is one of several factors sucking dynamism from
the market, which has long struggled to keep pace with other leading US metropolitan areas,
such as New York and San Francisco.”).
132. Paul F. Royle, Director, Div. of Inv. Mgmt of Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Risks and
Opportunities for Public Pension Plans, Keynote Address before the Public Funds Symposium
(July 17, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch507.htm [https://perma.cc/L3AF9GD9].
133. See, e.g., Justin Dini, Off the Beaten Track, INST. INV. MAG. (Apr. 30, 2001),
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b15134g1jpzkpd/off-the-beaten-track
[https://perma.cc/E59Q-R2EZ] (outlining the various pensions increasing investments in
alternatives including, one of the largest, CalPERS).
134. Royle, supra note 132.
135. Id. (“[T]he nature of hedge fund investments and the relative lack of regulation
mandates that you conduct adequate due diligence when considering these types of
investments.”).
136. Id. (“Another problem is potential conflicts of interest. Consultants hired to identify
hedge fund investments are sometimes involved on some level in servicing the hedge funds
they promote.”).
137. Id. (“High debt and secrecy have become parts of the hedge fund culture. Many hedge
fund managers make money because they are privy to information others do not have.”).
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Some pensions have started to retreat from hedge funds, 138 but
from 2007 to 2017, alternative investments in pensions increased from
making up 9% to 27% of total assets in public pension investment
portfolios. 139 Pension funds’ risky investments and behavior 140 are
largely attributed to the severity of their underfunding status and the
persistence of low interest rates. 141 The combination of both factors
account for an estimated one-third of public pension funds’ total risk, 142
with nearly 12% due to underfunded status alone. 143
C.

The Legal Protections of Pensions

As pensions are pushed towards insolvency by missed
contributions, the fund’s obligations to current and future pensioners need
to be restructured. 144 Current pensioners, however, have significant
protections that inhibit impairment of any future payments. 145 There are
four main types of protections given to enrolled pensioners among the
states: (1) common-law contractual, (2) common-law contractual and
state statutory; (3) state statutory; and (4) state constitutional. 146
138. See, e.g., Rob Copeland, New Jersey Backs Away from Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 3, 2016, 6:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-jersey-backs-away-from-hedgefunds-1470264516 [https://perma.cc/2M89-WNB4] (“New Jersey’s move is an about-face for
a state that had been one of the more enthusiastic proponents of hedge funds, scattering
billions of dollars across managers . . . . But the state’s hedge-fund investments collectively
were down 3% through the end of May for the calendar year and 6% for the fiscal year.”).
139. Liz Farmer, Pensions Have Tripled Their Investment in High-Risk Assets. Is It Paying
Off?, GOVERNING (May 8, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/govpublic-pension-investment-returns-alternative.html [https://perma.cc/GJ23-FMGA].
140. Risky investments and behavior are defined as a pension’s choice to invest in risky
assets as a “reach-for-yield” that include investments such as real estate and hedge funds. Lu
et al., supra note 17, at 1.
141. Id. (“We find that funds on average took more risk when risk-free rates and funding
ratios were lower, which is consistent with both the funding ratio and the risk-premia
channels.”).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 37 (“On average across states, the risk component associated with underfunding
represented about 12 percent of the total risk in 2016.”).
144. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 10, at 369–70 (“If municipalities are going to solve
their financial challenges, addressing these substantial pension liabilities in some fashion will
be necessary.”).
145. See Diane L. Dick, Bondholders vs. Retirees in Municipal Bankruptcies: The
Political Economy of Chapter 9, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. 73, 87 (2018) (“In effect, these legal
protections mean that public pension plan sponsors are obligated to provide promised benefits
whether or not they have adequately funded the plan, and regardless of how plan investments
have performed.”).
146. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR STATE PENSION AND RETIREE
HEALTH
BENEFITS
3
(2019),
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Michigan, New York, Illinois, Arizona, New Mexico, Louisiana, and
Arkansas have state constitutional provisions which protect pension
holders. 147 These state protections should be a concern for investors
because courts are unwilling to budge on the interpretation of pension
impairments pre-bankruptcy. 148
Alternatively, when a state attempts to reform its pension system
for future pensioners and fails, the outcome can tend to lower the credit
rating of the state. 149 This failure creates a snowball effect on the cost for
future bond issuance because the lower credit rating increases the yield a
state will be forced to pay on its bonds. 150 The legal and political
safeguards that both maintain pensioners’ benefits and stall reform for
future pensioners are important factors to be weighed when investing in
municipal bonds. 151
Nevertheless, pension reform is a necessary step to municipal
health. 152 It can look different depending on the state, but the trend seems
to be similar to the corporate model. 153 One example is in New Jersey,
where Governor Stephen Sweeney proposes to allow pensioners to
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2019/05/prs_legal_protections_for_state_and_local
_pension_and_retiree_medical_benefits_brief_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/46LV-VLYS]
[hereinafter LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR PENSIONS].
147. Id.
148. On May 8, 2015, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a pension law
meant to scale back pension benefits unconstitutional. See In re Pension Reform Litig., 32
N.E.3d 1, 22 (“The General Assembly may find itself in crisis, but it is a crisis which other
public pension systems managed to avoid and, as reflected in the SEC order, it is a crisis for
which the General Assembly itself is largely responsible.”). On December 3, 2018 the
Kentucky Supreme Court unanimously struck down a pension law meant to reform pensions
and lower cost striking a blow against the then-Governor attempt to address underfunded
pension concerns. See Bevin v. Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear, 563 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Ky.
2018); see also Dick, supra note 145, at 87 (“Public pensions are famously viewed as
“untouchable” outside of bankruptcy.”).
149. See, e.g., Kelly Nolan, Illinois Dinged by Downgrade, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2013,
7:03
PM)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323495604578539701130962058
[https://perma.cc/L5J6-9JJ3] (explaining when Illinois failed to pass pension overhaul both
Fitch Ratings and Moody’s Investors Service cut the state’s rating on its GO Bonds).
150. Id.
151. See Dick, supra note 145, at 87 (explaining how legal protections create an obligation
for the city to pay into the plan regardless of any factor).
152. See Chintamaneni, supra note 52, at 550–51 (“While the fate of public pensions in
municipal bankruptcy is uncertain, the need for reform in the operation and protection of
public pensions is clear from the growing number of cities with public pension crises.”).
153. Elizabeth Bauer, No, Public Pension Reform Experiments Have Not Failed, FORBES
(Aug. 16, 2019, 8:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ebauer/2019/08/16/no-publicpension-reform-experiments-have-not-failed/#a303d4e5bf72 [https://perma.cc/55E6-LEU2]
(explaining the states are experimenting with a “cash balance plan,” as they try to move away
from traditional “defined-benefits” pension plans).
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receive traditional pension benefits up to $40,000 of their salary. 154 After
this point, any additional earnings will be placed in a hybrid cash-balance
savings plan, similar to a 401k, 155 that would guarantee a 4% return for
workers even if the investments perform worse. 156 These types of
proposals are crucial to solving mounting pension obligations in some
states. 157
IV. WHAT INVESTORS SHOULD LEARN FROM MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCIES
To better appreciate the complete relationship between
underfunded pension plans and municipal bond safety, investors must
understand how pension obligations lead municipalities into default. 158
The two largest municipal bankruptcies—Detroit and Puerto Rico—
reveal red flags that investors should be aware of when buying municipal
bonds and the settlement outcomes that undermine the safety of
municipal bond investments. 159
A.

Detroit

Detroit’s bankruptcy came at a time when city pensions were $3.5
billion underfunded. 160 Detroit’s pension problem fermented over

154. Tony Howley, Sweeney’s Pension Proposal is What Our State Needs,
NORTHJERSEY.COM
(Aug.
17,
2019,
5:38
AM),
https://www.northjersey.com/story/opinion/contributors/2019/08/17/sweeneys-pensionproposal-what-nj-needs-howley/2030764001/ [https://perma.cc/7AWD-97VL].
155. Id.; see Julia Kagan, 401(k) Plans: The Complete Guide, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/401kplan.asp [https://perma.cc/2D92-2GNB] (last
visited Dec. 18, 2019) (“A 401(k) plan is a tax-advantaged, defined-contribution retirement
account offered by many employers to their employees.”).
156. Howley, supra note 154.
157. See Chintamaneni, supra note 52, at 550–51 (“While the fate of public pensions in
municipal bankruptcy is uncertain, the need for reform in the operation and protection of
public pensions is clear from the growing number of cities with public pension crises.”).
158. See Dick, supra note 145, at 91 (explaining the role pensioners play in underfunded
plans as they relate to bondholders).
159. See Matt Krantz, Detroit Bankruptcy Rattles Muni Bond Investors, USA TODAY (July
19, 2013, 1:07 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2013/07/19/detroitmuni-bond-investors/2568039 [https://perma.cc/G5ZE-QZ3H] (“Detroit’s bankruptcy
protection filing is introducing the word fear to the vocabulary of investors who have sought
shelter in the municipal bond market.”).
160. See Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to Section
109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code at 2-3, In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 2013).
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Michigan’s constitutional amendment that protected
decades. 161
payments to pensioners made it impossible for Detroit to reform how it
paid pensioners who were already in the system. 162 In 2005, Detroit
issued $1.44 billion in 15-year, floating-rate quasi-POBs 163 to fund the
growing gap within the city’s pension funds for firefighters, police, and
general employees. 164 Once the financial crisis took its toll on pension
accounts, the quasi-POB payments Detroit owed ballooned and continued
to represent a substantial percentage of the city’s revenue. 165
In addition to Detroit’s increasing pension obligations, by 2011,
Detroit had 100,000 vacant buildings, including homes and businesses. 166
The city lost one-quarter of its population over the decade. 167 It was an
unprecedented collapse of an American city, with 60% of its peak
population gone. 168 At the time, Detroit citizens faced one of the highest
property tax burdens of any city. 169 As the city neared bankruptcy in
2012, it was considered, the most dangerous city in America for the fourth
year in a row,. 170 Detroit’s violent crime rate was five times the national

161. Dick, supra note 145, at 100 (“Like its bankrupt peer cities in California, Detroit’s
major creditors included participants in the city’s almost entirely unfunded retiree health plan,
participants in underfunded pension plans, and capital market creditors.”).
162. The Michigan Constitution states: “The accrued financial benefits of each pension
plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual
obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.” MICH. CONST. ART. IX,
§ 24.
163. Dick, supra note 145, at 101 (explaining the bonds were called Certificate of
Participation (“COP”) bonds but functioned the same way as POBs. Detroit could not issue
POBs to shore up its pension fund because it had reached its constitutional debt limit.
Therefore, it issued these COPs to “sidestep” laws enabling it to not call the issued bonds debt
on its balance sheet.).
164. Id. at 100–01.
165. CITY
OF
DET..,
PROPOSAL
FOR
CREDITORS
27–28
(2013),
https://detroitmi.gov/sites/detroitmi.localhost/files/201805/City%20of%20Detroit%20Proposal%20for%20Creditors1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/429Z6LHQ] (outlining the City of Detroit’s large, pre-petition, COP liabilities by 2013).
166. Monica Davey, The Odd Challenges for Detroit Planners, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/us/06detroit.html [https://perma.cc/XH2N-GWSV].
167. Scott Martelle, The Collapse of Detroit, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2011, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-xpm-2011-mar-27-la-oe-martelle-detroit-20110327story.html [https://perma.cc/UD7Y-NM6U].
168. Id.
169. See Declaration of Kevyn D. Orr in Support of the City of Detroit, Michigan’s
Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code at 4–5, In re
City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013).
170. Daniel Fisher, Detroit Tops the 2012 List of America’s Most Dangerous Cities,
FORBES
(Oct.
18,
2012,
1:26
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/10/18/detroit-tops-the-2012-list-ofamericas-most-dangerous-cities/#401eef3c2931 [https://perma.cc/CTE3-HA4V].
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average. 171 Nevertheless, the police force had let go of 200 officers,
nearly 10% of its total force, 172 and the fire department lost fourteen of
its firefighting engines. 173 With citizens feeling unsafe in their own
homes 174 and police officers holding an “Enter At Your Own Risk”
rally, 175 Detroit had no choice but to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy on July
18, 2013. 176
B.

Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico also experienced a huge pension crisis. 177 In 2016,
Puerto Rico had $2 billion in assets among its pension funds compared to
$45 billion in pension liabilities. 178 Residents left Puerto Rico in record
amounts, shrinking a tax base necessary to cover the territory’s growing
obligations. 179 On July 1, 2016, Puerto Rico declared its intention to

171. Id.
172. See id. (stating that the City of Detroit cut some 200 officers from its 2500 strong

police force).
173. Rod Meloni, Detroit Fire Department Is Forced to Make Big Cuts, Eliminating
Several Engine, Ladder Companies, CLICKONDETROIT (July 2, 2012, 11:14 PM),
https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/2012/07/03/detroit-fire-department-is-forced-tomake-big-cuts-eliminating-several-engine-ladder-companies/
[https://perma.cc/EQ2H36NF].
174. Id. (noting that one citizen stated “I’m constantly on guard here due to the fact that
police aren’t what they should be, the Fire Department is not what it should be”).
175. Enter at Your Own Risk: Police Union Says ‘War-Like’ Detroit is Unsafe for Visitors,
CBS DET. (Oct. 6, 2012, 11:57 AM), https://detroit.cbslocal.com/2012/10/06/enter-at-yourown-risk-police-union-says-war-like-detroit-is-unsafe-for-visitors/ [https://perma.cc/V2277KM4].
176. Bankruptcy Petition, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013); see Monica Davey & Mary Walsh, Billions in Debt,
(July
18,
2013),
Detroit
Tumbles
into
Insolvency,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-for-bankruptcy.html
[https://perma.cc/SFV2-7PL2] (“Detroit, the cradle of America’s automobile industry and
once the nation’s fourth-most-populous city, filed for bankruptcy on Thursday, the largest
American city ever to take such a course.”).
177. See Nick Brown, Puerto Rico’s Other Crisis; Impoverished Pensions, REUTERS (Apr.
7, 2016, 3:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-puertoricopensions/ [https://perma.cc/6NE4-3HH9] (explaining Puerto Rico’s pension crisis
perpetuated by leaders characterized as “eternal optimists”).
178. Nick Timiraos, Puerto Rico’s Pensions: $2 Billion in Assets, $45 Billion in
Liabilities, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2016, 4:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/puerto-ricospensions-2-billion-in-assets-45-billion-in-liabilities-1472156434 [https://perma.cc/A9MT3WFP].
179. See Alan Yuhas, Economic Exodus Means Two-Thirds of Puerto Ricans May Soon
Live
in
States,
GUARDIAN
(July
2,
2015,
7:00
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/02/puerto-rico-economy-exodus-us-mainland
[https://perma.cc/5QGQ-WZU4] (“Facing a crisis of monumental proportions at home, tens
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default on its GO bonds for the first time. 180 Puerto Rico’s then-Governor
Ricardo Nevares argued that funding teachers, emergency personnel, and
other critical functions should take priority over Puerto Rico’s obligation
to its bondholders. 181 The night before Puerto Rico declared it was going
to default, then-President Barack Obama signed the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”)., 182
which allowed the island to stop making payments to its bondholders. 183
PROMESA created a committee to oversee the restructuring of all of
Puerto Rico’s debt. 184
Shortly after PROMESA was formed, a 10-year-old boy was shot
in the head near the pool of a popular hotel in Puerto Rico, 185 casting
light on the high crime rate the territory was facing. 186 Puerto Rico had
seen massive layoffs to teachers, police, and firefighters over the prior
years. 187 By 2017, Puerto Rico’s underfunded pensions increased to $50
billion, and its total debt was $74 billion. 188 With no possible way to

of thousands of people are fleeing a Caribbean island in search of a better life in the United
States.”).
180. Heather Long. Puerto Rico Makes Historic Default, CNN (July 1, 2016, 3:05 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2016/07/01/investing/puerto-rico-defaults-general-obligationbonds/index.html [https://perma.cc/G72G-4A5J].
181. See id. (“This administration continues to take historic steps to ensure the residents
of Puerto Rico continue to receive essential services while the commonwealth continues to
face a delicate financial situation,’ a spokesman said.”).
182. Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”),
Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 2101 (2018)); see also Nick
Timiraos & Bryan Tau, President Obama Signs Puerto Rico Debt-Relief Bill, WALL ST. J.
(June 30, 2016, 5:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/president-obama-signs-puerto-ricodebt-relief-bill-1467321998?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/SD6Q-44KB] (explaining
the actions of the White House and what the Debt Relief bill would mean for Puerto Rico).
183. Timiraos & Tau, supra note 182.
184. Id.
185. Child Killed at Puerto Rico Sparks Concerns over Rising Murder Rate, GUARDIAN
(July 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/05/puerto-rico-hotel-childmurder-rate [https://perma.cc/VHK2-CSJD].
186. Id.
187. See Michael A. Fletcher, Already Deep in Debt, Puerto Rico Now Faces a New Crisis,
WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2015), washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/05/26/already-deepin-debt-puerto-rico-now-faces-a-new-crisis/?arc404=true
[https://perma.cc/L9RN-8CT5]
(explaining the looming collapse of the island’s healthcare system); Alan Yuhas, Economic
Exodus Means Two-Thirds of Puerto Ricans May Soon Live in States, THE GUARDIAN (July
2, 2015, 7:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/02/puerto-rico-economyexodus-us-mainland [https://perma.cc/4D5H-XHUR] (“Unable to pay its $73bn debt, Puerto
Rico has begun closing schools and watching its healthcare system collapse and 45% of its
people living in poverty.”).
188. Martin Z. Braun & Johnathan Levin, Debt Island: How $74 Billion in Bonds
Bankrupted
Puerto
Rico,
BLOOMBERG
(May
15,
2017,
5:00
AM),
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continue to maintain public services, pension payments, and bond
payments, Puerto Rico’s then-Governor filed for bankruptcy on May 2,
2017. 189
C.

Bondholders in Bankruptcy

For bondholders, the primary lesson of Detroit and Puerto Rico’s
bankruptcy was that pensioners come before bondholders, and Wall
Street loses. 190 In Detroit, Federal Court Judge Steven Rhodes showed
concern for pension holders when making his final ruling: “[the] court
emphasizes that it will not lightly or casually exercise the power under
federal bankruptcy law to impair pensions.” 191 In Detroit’s final
settlement, pensioners received at least 60% of their pensions owed, 192
with no more than 4.5% individual cuts to city retirees. 193 In contrast,

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-15/debt-island-how-74-billion-inbonds-bankrupted-puerto-rico [https://perma.cc/ULL3-7WJY].
189. Letter to Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. to Restructure Debts under Title III of
PROMESA (2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3696507/Puerto-Rico-sLetter-on-Debt.pdf [https://perma.cc/SFT2-FJWU]; see Heather Long, Puerto Rico Files for
Biggest US Municipal Bankruptcy, CNN (May 3, 2017, 2:50 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2017/05/03/news/economy/puerto-rico-wants-to-file-forbankruptcy/index.html [https://perma.cc/P64P-GWXF] (“It’s the biggest municipal
bankruptcy filing ever in the US. Puerto Rico currently owes its creditors a whopping $70
billion, far higher than Detroit’s $18 billion bankruptcy in 2013.”).
190. See Michael Aneiro, Seven Lessons from Detroit’s Bankruptcy for Muni Investors,
BARRONS (Oct. 24, 2014, 4:42 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/seven-lessons-fromdetroits-bankruptcy-for-muni-investors-1414183339 [https://perma.cc/3HPK-9KBS].
191. Michigan pension holders are protected by a clause in their state constitution. MICH.
CONST. ART. IX, § 24. As part of Detroit’s initial bankruptcy filing was a plan to cut pension
payments, and the Ingham County Circuit court initially ruled that cutting pensions was a
violation of the State’s constitution. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, Webster v. State, No. 13-734CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 18, 2013). Although in Federal Bankruptcy Court, Judge Rhodes
allowed the pension cuts holding that “accrued benefits” were not protected, because federal
bankruptcy court, preempts state court’s jurisdiction. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R.
97,
154
(Bankr.
E.D.
Mich.
2013);
see
also
David
A.
Skeel,
Jr., The Education of Detroit’s Pension and Bond Creditors, 2 PENN WHARTON PUB. POL’Y
INITIATIVE
1,
3
(2014), http://
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/files/166-a
[https://perma.cc/QG9H-BG8G] (“Because the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to
enact bankruptcy laws, and the municipal bankruptcy law that Congress has enacted permits
a city to restructure its ordinary debts, the unfunded portion of a pension can be restructured
even if state law seems to say pensions are sacrosanct.”).
192. David Skeel, Fixing Puerto Rico’s Debt Mess, WALL ST. J.: OPINION (Jan. 15, 2016,
7:29
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fixing-puerto-ricos-debt-mess1452040144?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/VVE7-3NK9].
193. Aneiro, supra note 190 (“[Bank of America] notes that city pensioners were
minimally impaired, with cuts of no more than 4.5% and the elimination of annual COLA
increases.”).
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Detroit’s GO bondholders received only 41% of their owed
obligations. 194
In Puerto Rico, under the bankruptcy settlement, 61% of retirees
would see no reduction in their pensions, 195 and cuts to monthly pensions
totaling more than $1,200 would be capped at 8.5%. 196 However, GO
bondholders received just 55% of their investment back, 197 causing a
downgrade for GO bonds in Puerto Rico. 198 The outcome of both
settlements reflects the unequal displacement of the payback to
bondholders and pensioners, which legally had the “same priority.” 199
This preference is largely due to politicians who, when deciding
settlements, place a higher value on pensioners than bondholders. 200
Not only did bondholders receive a smaller percentage of their
claims than pensioners, but the underlying safeguards for some of their
bonds also changed during Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy. 201 In particular,
the bankruptcy completely shifted the market’s understanding of how
194. Skeel, supra note 192.
195. Karen Pierog, Puerto Rico Oversight Board Reaches Deal over Retiree Pensions,

REUTERS (July 12, 2019, 5:43 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usapuertorico/puerto-rico-oversight-board-reaches-deal-over-retiree-pensionsidUSKCN1TD2RZ [https://perma.cc/SXC9-QRWZ].
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Notice to Shareholders, Recent Dev. Highlights Pertaining to the Commonwealth of
P.R and the UBS and P.R. Inv’rs Families of Funds (Each, a “Fund” and Collectively, the
“Funds”),
UBS
(Aug.
23,
2019),
https://www.ubs.com/us/en/wealthmanagement/information/puerto-ricofunds/_jcr_content/rightpar/innergrid/xcol1/teaser/linklist/link.0689094754.file/bGluay9wY
XRoPS9jb250ZW50L2RhbS9hc3NldHMvd21hL3ByL2RvYy9jb21tb253ZWFsdGgtcHJvb
WVzYS11cGRhdGUtMDgyMzE5LnBkZg==/commonwealth-promesa-update-082319.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AP3Q-9W5H] (“Fitch Ratings (‘Fitch’), Moody’s Investors Service
(‘Moody’s’), and S&P Global Ratings (‘S&P’) have downgraded the general obligation bonds
(‘GOs’) of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as well as the obligations of certain
Commonwealth agencies and public corporations.”).
199. Skeel, supra note 192.
200. See In re City of Stockton, California, 526 B.R. 35, 39 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.), aff’d in
part, 542 B.R. 261 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015). (In Stockton, California bankruptcy, the judge
allowed pensions to be modified. In an oral opinion, the judge said the California Public
Employee’s Retirement System “has bullied its way about in this case with an iron fist
insisting it and the municipal pensions it services are inviolable. The bully may have an iron
fist, but it also turns out to have a glass jaw.”); Although, the pressure from CALPERS made
the politicians decide not to reduce pensions at all, and the bondholders took most of the cuts.
Marc Lifsher & Melody Petersen, Judge Approves Stockton Bankruptcy Plan; Worker
Pensions Safe, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2014, 1:13 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fistockton-pension-court-ruling-cuts-20141029-story.html [https://perma.cc/5LUT-ZMW5].
201. Alexandra Scaggs, Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy Case Casts a Shadow on Billions in
Municipal
Bonds,
BARRONS
(May
23,
2019,
9:48
AM),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/municipal-special-revenue-bonds-review-court-rulingpuerto-rico-chicago-51558554529 [https://perma.cc/85YU-JA8D].
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special revenue bonds are viewed during a municipality’s bankruptcy. 202
Before Puerto Rico’s insolvency, special revenue bonds were
continuously paid out by a municipality during the bankruptcy period. 203
This changed when the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the special
revenue bondholders relief during bankruptcy, calling continued
payments permitted but not required. 204 On July 31, 2019, the First
Circuit denied rehearsing en banc and issued an opinion affirming its
holding on special revenue bonds. 205 The impact of Puerto Rico’s
bankruptcy on the safety of special revenue bonds 206 caused rating
agencies to review their grades on special revenue bonds for potential
downgrades. 207
D.

Warnings for Municipal Bond Investors from Municipal
Bankruptcies

The bankruptcies of Detroit and Puerto Rico reveal two
overarching themes: 208 first, the red flags investors should look out for
when determining the risk for an investment in municipal bonds; 209 and
second, the underlying preferential treatment for pensioners over
bondholders in bankruptcy settlements. 210
The red flags an investor should look for before investing in
municipal bonds become apparent as a municipality nears closer to
default. 211 A state or local government with a high underfunded pension
liability leads to a decreasing population, an increasing tax, and
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 919 F.3d 121, 132 (1st Cir. 2019) (“In

sum, Sections 928(a) and 922(d) permit, but do not require, continued payment during the
pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings.”).
205. In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 931 F.3d 111, 115 (1st Cir. 2019)
(“Section 922(d) commands that “application of pledged special revenues” be done in a
manner “consistent” with section 928—which in turn provides that liens on special revenues
“shall be subject to the necessary operating expenses” of the project or system.”); see also
Assured Guar. Corp. v. Fin. Oversight Bd., No. 19-391, 2020 WL 129573, at (U.S. Jan. 13,
2020) (indicating the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari on the case).
206. See Sasseen, supra note 38 (explaining the uncertainty and fear Puerto Rico has
caused the municipal bond market as it relates to special revenue bonds.).
207. Scaggs, supra note 201 (explaining that Moody’s is reviewing “$14 billion of
municipal special-revenue bonds and that Fitch is reviewing “seven series of special-revenue
bonds” in response to Puerto Rico ruling).
208. See supra Part IV.A–B.
209. See supra Part IV.A–B.
210. See supra Part IV.C.
211. See supra Part IV.A–B.
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increasing crime rate, all accompanied by decreasing coverage of
essential services. 212 The red flag—a decline in essential services—is
critical to the likelihood of a municipal bond default. 213 In Detroit’s
bankruptcy hearing in 2013, when weighing whether or not to approve
Detroit’s Chapter 9 filing, Judge Rhodes stated: “It is the City’s service
delivery insolvency that the Court finds most strikingly disturbing in this
case.” 214 In another hearing in 2014, Judge Rhodes stated: “[The service
insolvency] is inhumane and intolerable, and it must be fixed.” 215 When
these red flags are present and eventually present themselves as unmet
essential services, the chance of a municipality bankruptcy filing
occurring and being accepted rises. 216 The length of such bankruptcy
may depend on the municipality’s ability to right its essential services. 217
The second theme, preference for pensioners, has been evident
through the outcomes in municipal bankruptcy cases. 218 Investors should
heed this risk of being subordinated in payout preference as they were in
Detroit and Puerto Rico. 219 When a municipality defaults, investors will
not come out whole, and the protections their bonds allegedly have and
payments they expect could continue to change as more defaults occur in
the future. 220

212. See, e.g., Shields, supra note 102 (explaining Illinois state mandate to increase its
funding for pensions has caused municipal bond rating downgrades as well as cuts to essential
services).
213. Stephen Fehr, ‘Service-Delivery Insolvency’ is Changing Municipal Bankruptcy,
PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2017/02/23/service-delivery-insolvency-is-changing-municipalbankruptcy [https://perma.cc/F7LQ-EF7E].
214. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 97, 170 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); see also
Fehr, supra note 213 (“Neither city could pay their unsustainable debts, but officials’ failure
to curb violent crime, spreading blight and decaying infrastructure was even more compelling
to the federal bankruptcy judges who decided that Stockton and Detroit were eligible to file
for Chapter 9.”).
215. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 262 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
216. See Fehr, supra note 213 (stating that service insolvency is a persuasive factor for a
judge in allowing a municipality to successfully file for bankruptcy).
217. Id.
218. See Dick, supra note 145, at 77 (“Many chapter 9 debtors have simply chosen to be
more generous to their employees and retirees, even if it requires cramming down a plan that
severely impairs the rights of other creditors.”).
219. See supra Part IV. A-B; see also Skeel, supra note 192 (“Bankruptcy can work, but
bankruptcy laws need to be changed to ensure fair treatment of creditors.”).
220. See Krantz, supra note 159 (“Detroit’s bankruptcy protection filing is introducing the
word fear to the vocabulary of investors who have sought shelter in the municipal bond
market.”).
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V. HOW MUNICIPALITIES PITCH INVESTORS
Like Detroit and Puerto Rico, some states face major pension
problems. 221 Two states in particular, New Jersey and Illinois, are
currently showing red flags that should concern investors about their
municipal bond holdings. 222 These states are experiencing budget
deficits, vendor defaults, and troubling cuts to necessary public services
in order to pay for pension liabilities. 223
A.

The Struggling States with the Highest Pension Obligations

In 2019, Illinois had the worst fiscal health of any state. 224
Further, Illinois is ranked as the third-worst state in its pension plan
funding percentage, 225 while holding the nation’s largest pension debt. 226
Illinois’s adjusted net pension liability is $240.8 billion as of June 2018,
which is five times the total state revenue. 227 On top of its pension
221. See Andrew B. Dawson, Beyond the Great Divide: Federalism Concerns in
Municipal Insolvency, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 34 (2017) (“As more municipalities are
sinking into financial distress, weighed down in large part by unsustainable legacy costs, there
have been an unprecedented number of municipal bankruptcy filings.”); see also T. Leigh
Anenson, Alex Slabaugh & Karen E. Lahey, Reforming Public Pensions, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 1, 12 (2014) (“Even with an optimistic rate of return on pension fund investments,
projections estimate that plans in seven states will be insolvent by 2020 and plans in half the
states will be broke by 2027.”).
222. See Michael Cembalest, J.P. MORGAN PRIVATE BANK, THE ARC AND THE COVENANTS
4.0 2, https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320746272624.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TBS6C53] (“Illinois and New Jersey come closest in my view to deteriorations in pension finances
that are practically irreversible.”).
223. See Adam Schuster, Illinois Public Services Being Cut to Pay Unsustainable Pension
Cost, ILLINOIS POL’Y, https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/illinois-public-services-beingcut-to-pay-unsustainable-pension-cost/ [https://perma.cc/M8HS-YF8B] (last visited Dec. 26,
2019) (“Public pensions are already eating away Illinois government services, increasing by
more than 500% during the past 20 years as spending on core services including child
protection, state police and college money for poor students has dropped by nearly one-third
since 2000.”).
224. Olivia Gonzalez, Ranking the States by Fiscal Condition: Illinois, MERCATUS CTR.
(Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/50-ranking-states-fiscal-conditionillinois [https://perma.cc/VJ36-K297] (“Illinois performs poorly on just about every metric
that goes into calculating its overall rank.”).
225. By the numbers: Illinois ranks 3rd worst on pension plan funding, CTR. SQUARE (Sept.
6, 2019), https://www.thecentersquare.com/illinois/by-the-numbers-illinois-ranks-rd-worston-pension-plan/article_16e71256-cf2f-11e9-9586-fbb02740d006.html
[https://perma.cc/W88P-W32F].
226. Id.
227. Pisea Chea, Research Announcement: Moody’s- US States’ Pension Liabilities Fall
in Fiscal 2018 amid Higher Investment Returns, MOODY’S INVS. SERVS. (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://m.moodys.com/research/Moodys-US-states-pension-liabilities-fall-in-fiscal-2018amid—PBM_1195186 [https://perma.cc/8ZLR-MSM2]. Other sources state the pension
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liability, the state has $25.8 billion in POBs outstanding. 228 By 2020,
Illinois’s required contributions to pensions will total $9.3 billion, onequarter of Illinois’ general funds budget. 229 Illinois likely has three
options to begin to fill the underfunded gap: (1) a 25% tax hike; (2) a
689% increase in contributions; or (3) an 11.9 % assumed rate of
return. 230
In some of Illinois’s cities, pensions have become so underfunded
that the worst-off pensions are allowed to compel the state Comptroller
to withhold tax revenue from municipalities and reallocate that revenue
to their cities’ pension plans. 231 This pension-intercept law 232 has

liability for Illinois at 137.3 billion at the end of fiscal 2019. Illinois’ Unfunded Pension
Liability Rises to $137.3 Billion, REUTERS (Dec. 4, 2019, 6:37 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-illinois-pensions/illinois-unfunded-pension-liabilityrises-to-137-3-billion-idUSKBN1Y82ZP [https://perma.cc/Z7UY-PA5D].
The “real”
number is likely somewhere in between depending on one’s discount rate chosen. See
Thomas J. Healey, Commentary, A Note on the Discount Rate, PENSIONS & INVS. (Oct. 8,
2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/industry-voices/commentary-note-discount-rate
[https://perma.cc/F7A4-4AQZ] (“Using expected future return on assets, the total liability of
U.S. state pension plans is about $1.4 trillion (according to the Pew Charitable Trusts), while
utilizing a risk-free rate of 2% yields a liability estimate of more than $4 trillion (according
to the American Legislative Exchange Council as well Moody’s Investors Service). Again,
the average 10-year return as of June 30, 2018, for the country’s three largest public plans
was 5%.”).
228. Illinois’ Pension Bonds: The Other $26 Billion Obligation You Shouldn’t Ignore, ILL.
POL’Y
https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/illinois-pension-bonds-the-other-26-billionobligation-you-shouldnt-ignore/ [https://perma.cc/2WD8-QPAQ] (last visited Dec. 19,
2019); see also Statement No. 27 of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, supra
note 97 (“The ARC does not include payments of pension-related debt. Therefore, those
payments should not be included in annual pension cost.”).
229. Dan Hynes, DIGGING OUT: THE RAUNER WRECKAGE REPORT 7, (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://www2.illinois.gov/IISNews/19698-Digging_Out__The_Rauner_Wreckage_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/653T-7859] (“The state’s largest
obligation, pensions, continues to take up a greater and greater share of the state budget.”).
230. Cembalest, supra note 222, at 2; see also Natasha Frost, US States Hope Legalization
of Weed Will Solve Their Pension Crisis, QUARTZ (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://qz.com/1493246/illinois-new-jersey-look-at-legalized-weed-to-fund-pension-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/JU8F-WN5J] (explaining that some states are looking to marijuana
legalization as a way to help their pensions funds).
231. Caitlin Devitt, Intercept Law Puts Distressed Illinois Cities in the Crosshairs for
(May
1,
2018,
2:04
PM),
Added
Oversight,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/debtwire/2018/05/01/new-pension-intercept-law-putsdistressed-illinois-cities-in-the-crosshairs-for-added-oversight/#6384a9fa61d7
[https://perma.cc/M68F-MWTX].
232. Public Act 1495, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016); see also Amanda Kass &
Andrew Crosby, LIFE PRESERVERS OR ANCHORS? AN EXAMINATION OF STATE INTERVENTION
IN MUNICIPAL PENSION FUNDING IN ILLINOIS 1, GOV. FIN. RES. CTR. (July 2019),
https://gfrc.uic.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/188/2019/07/2019July_Life-Preservers-orAnchors.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQJ3-TSC2] (“Starting in fiscal year (FY) 2016, the
enforcement mechanism allows the State Comptroller to intercept state sharing revenue if
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wreaked havoc on Illinois’ struggling cities as near depleted pensions
intercept city revenues that would normally go toward essential services
and payroll. 233 With pensions in Illinois wavering at 35% funded, 234 the
intercept law has been used by pension funds in the cities of Harvey,
North Chicago, Chicago, and East St. Louis. 235 What was meant to hold
municipalities accountable for underpaying their pension plans has
caused these cities to become more cash-strapped and fiscally insolvent
than ever before. 236
Similarly, New Jersey has $239 billion of outstanding and
anticipated debt. 237 Of that debt, $45.16 billion is in municipal bonds,
and the state needs $115 billion to cover future outstanding payments to
the state pension fund. 238 Taxpayers are expected to be burdened by
$99.6 billion to support the underfunded public pension system in the
state. 239 New Jersey would have to raise its contributions by 521% or
increase its tax revenues by 22% to begin to close the underfunded gap—
but the vital change has yet to occur. 240 The Governor of New Jersey,
Phil Murphy, expects to make pension contributions of only 70% of the
municipalities’ contributions to their police and fire pension funds fall short of what their
contributions are supposed to be under state law.”).
233. See, e.g., KASS & CROSBY, supra note 232, at 1 (“Harvey finds itself pushed to the
brink by a new law that allows pension funds to compel the state Comptroller to withhold
state tax revenue that traditionally would go to the city.”).
234. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., The State Pension Funding Gap: 2017 4 (June 2019),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2019/06/statepensionfundinggap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LB4M-CMCY].
235. See Yvette Shields, Chicago Loses First Round in Pension Fund Intercept Litigation,
BOND BUYER (June 7, 2019, 2:59 PM), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/chicago-losesfirst-round-in-pension-fund-intercept-litigation [https://perma.cc/CGD4-U69Q] (explaining a
Chicago firefighter pension fund filed a $24 million claim for their pension funded at 26.5%);
Yvette Shields, Cash-Strapped East St. Louis Joins Illinois Pension Intercept Illinois,
FIDELITY.COM
(Sept.
19,
2019,
5:03
PM),
https://fixedincome.fidelity.com/ftgw/fi/FINewsArticle?id=201909191703SM______BND
BUYER_0000016d-4ad5-d046-a3fd-cff7c3af0000_110.1 [https://perma.cc/2EU5-HTFD]
(explaining that the East St. Louis Firefighters submitting a pension intercept request of 2.2.
million to the comptroller as their pension is only 11% funded).
236. Frank Shafroth, The Fiscal Firebomb Looming for Small Cities in Illinois,
GOVERNING (July 2018), https://www.governing.com/columns/public-money/gov-illinoispensions.html [https://perma.cc/JM4X-LHFP] (“A state law meant to hold municipalities
accountable for pension payments may actually worsen a coming fiscal crisis.”).
237. Ashley Balcerzak, How Deep Is NJ in Debt? Very, Very Deep but Not as Bad as 2017,
USA
TODAY
(June
3,
2019,
6:04
AM),
https://www.northjersey.com/story/money/2019/06/03/new-jersey-state-debt-reportanalysis/1301540001/ [https://perma.cc/MV4H-TSZA].
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Cembalest, supra note 222.
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recommended ARC amount each year 241 and by 2023 pay the full
recommended amount. 242 This promise came after Governor Murphy
raised the assumed rate of return for New Jersey pensions 243 after thengovernor Chris Christie’s office previously lowered the return rate to
reflect a more realistic assumption. 244 Murphy’s action has allowed the
state’s pension funds to appear healthier and, in turn, has lowered the
state’s contributions. 245
Both Illinois and New Jersey’s pension obligations are massive
and they alone cause concern for the future viability of the states. 246
However, just as in Detroit and Puerto Rico, the pension obligations are
one piece of a larger puzzle. 247 Pension viability does not tell the full
story of what is going on inside these states. 248 To view the other red
flags pointing towards bankruptcy, all an investor must do is look closely
at cities within the two states. 249
B.

The Reality Facing Citizens in Illinois and New Jersey

In Harvey, Illinois, employees in City Hall were left without air
conditioning and threatened to leave work, citing unbearable conditions

241. Balcerzak, supra note 237.
242. Id.
243. Christian Hetrick, Phil Murphy Reverses Chris Christie’s Change to Pension System,

OBSERVER.COM (Mar. 2, 2018, 5:21 PM), https://observer.com/2018/03/murphy-reverseschristie-pension-system-change/ [https://perma.cc/54VN-EARY] (“Gov. Phil Murphy’s
administration reversed a change made by Chris Christie to New Jersey’s pension system that
would have forced state and local governments to pay hundreds of millions of dollars more
into the ailing pension system next year.”).
244. Robert Snyder, New Jersey Lowers Assumed Rate of Return to 7%, PENSIONS & INVS.
(Dec.
21,
2017,
12:00
AM),
https://www.pionline.com/article/20171221/ONLINE/171229973/new-jersey-lowersassumed-rate-of-return-to-7 [https://perma.cc/LMB7-TQ36] (“The New Jersey Pension
Fund’s assumed rate of return has been reduced to 7% from 7.65% by state Treasurer Ford
M. Scudder, the second rate cut he has enacted this year.”).
245. Hilary Russ, New Jersey Treasurer Resets Public Pension Rate of Return, REUTERS
(Mar. 1 , 2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-new-jersey-pensions/newjersey-treasurer-resets-public-pension-rate-of-return-idUSKCN1GD6MF
[https://perma.cc/A5T4-4TAN] (“The switch to a higher assumed rate means that the state,
and participating local governments in New Jersey, will for now escape the higher costs that
arise when investment return assumptions are lowered.”).
246. Cembalest, supra note 222, at 2.
247. See supra Part III.C.
248. Shafroth, supra note 236.
249. See id. (explaining the fiscal trouble facing smaller cities in Illinois).
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because the city failed to pay its electricity bill on time. 250 On another
occasion, the non-emergency 911 number was cut off for three days
because the city was $14,000 in arrears on its phone bill, leaving citizens
and possible alarm systems calling for help with no response. 251 Even
one of Harvey’s trash vendors allegedly demanded a check in full on the
steps of City Hall to continue services. 252
In concurrence with vendor defaults, 253 massive layoffs continue
to occur in Harvey each year. 254 In 2018, due to a successful pension
intercept request from the Harvey’s firefighter pension plan, 255 forty
police and fire employees were let go, representing nearly half of
Harvey’s force. 256 Therefore, Harvey’s firefighters’ attempt to secure
their pensions resulted in a significant amount of firefighters in the
department being fired. 257 All the while, Harvey maintains one of the
highest per capita crime rates in the state. 258 Furthermore, Harvey’s
citizens face unbearable tax hikes, represented by approximately 4,000
outstanding property tax bills. 259 Harvey has even defaulted on GO
bonds multiple times during the past three years. 260 Even so, the city

250. Zak Koeske Harvey Officials Are Scrambling After Police and Fire Non-emergency
Phone Lines were Disconnected for Nonpayment, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 23, 2019, 12:08 AM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/ct-sta-harvey-phone-linedisconnection-st-0825-20190823-j6sncdhz5rhbtfmkfqx7rxfyp4-story.html
[https://perma.cc/736E-FYXQ].
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Zak Koeske, Harvey Lays off 40 Police and Fire Employees, Union Officials Say,
CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2018, 4:25 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/dailysouthtown/ct-sta-harvey-layoffs-st-0411-story.html [https://perma.cc/D25X-R6S9].
255. Zak Koeske, Harvey Reaches Pension Fund Repayment Agreement; State to Cease
Witholding
Tax
Revenues,
CHI.
TRIB.
(July
24,
2018),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/ct-sta-harvey-pension-agreementst-0725-story.html [https://perma.cc/2TUS-SV3H] (“Harvey City Council unanimously
approved a repayment agreement Monday with its police and fire pension funds, effectively
resolving a months-long dispute over withheld state tax revenues that Harvey claimed had
placed it on the brink of financial collapse and forced it to lay off 40 public safety workers.”).
256. Koeske, supra note 250.
257. Id.
258. John Dodge, The 10 ‘Most Dangerous’ Towns in Illinois, CBSCHICAGO (Dec. 16,
2014, 12:11 PM), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/12/16/the-10-most-dangerous-towns-inillinois/ [https://perma.cc/RJS6-N7JU].
259. Shafroth, supra note 236.
260. The Editorial Board, Have We Got a Muni Bond for You, WALL ST. J: OPINION (May
10, 2018, 7:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/have-we-got-a-muni-bond-for-you1525993374 [https://perma.cc/33DM-C54L] (“Harvey has already defaulted on eight debt
service payments over the past two years.”).
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cannot seek bankruptcy without permission from the state, leaving it with
insurmountable obligations and declining revenues. 261
Similarly situated to Harvey, is Camden, New Jersey, where the
Camden’s School District plans to close schools and layoff
approximately 300 teachers, 262 as the city faced a $27 million budget
deficit in 2019. 263 Since 2016, the city has suffered a “dirty water
problem” 264 with lead leaking into the city’s public water and the cost of
repair too high to afford. 265 Schools have been forced to include a special
line in their budget for water coolers and paper cups each year to provide
clean water. 266 Despite having one of the worst murder rates in
America, 267 police layoffs have occurred sharply in the past in
Camden. 268
All the red flags of prior bankruptcies currently exist in Illinois
and New Jersey today, and there is no easy solution. 269 The conditions
in Harvey and Camden reflect the conditions in many cities in Illinois,
New Jersey, and other underfunded states that are forced to make cuts to

261. Id. (“Under Illinois law, cities cannot file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, which provides
a venue for impairing contracts.”).
262. David Madden, Camden Teachers Union: School Closings and Cuts Could be
NEWSRADIO
(Apr.
9,
2019,
5:04
PM),
Coming,
KYW
https://kywnewsradio.radio.com/articles/news/camden-teachers-union-school-closings-andcuts-could-be-coming [https://perma.cc/F5R9-U9LP].
263. See Stephen Danley, The Camden Education Crisis We All Knew was Coming,
RUTGERS
U.CAMDEN:
LOC.
KNOWLEDGE
BLOG
(Apr.
3,
2019),
https://danley.camden.rutgers.edu/2019/04/03/the-camden-education-crisis-we-all-knewwas-coming/ [https://perma.cc/K5EZ-TFQH] (explaining the 27-million-dollar deficit is the
start of “financial crisis” for the school district).
264. Greg Adomaitis, How 1 N.J. District Has Beaten its Dirty Water Problem— for 14
years,
NJ.COM
(Mar.
31,
2016),
https://www.nj.com/camden/2016/03/this_nj_citys_school_water_crisis_predates_newark.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/7NDQ-CPW5].
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Mike Maciag, Why Camden, N.J., the Murder Capital of the Country, Disbanded Its
Police Force, GOVERNING (June 2014), https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justicesafety/gov-camden-disbands-police-force-for-new-department.html
[https://perma.cc/AG8Q-E7CD].
268. See Jason Laday, Camden Police Layoff Plan Approved by State, Layoffs to Begin
April
30,
NJ.COM
(Jan.
2,
2013),
https://www.nj.com/gloucestercounty/2013/01/state_approves_camden_police_l.html
[https://perma.cc/7A4M-7MNQ]
(explaining in 2013, 265 police officers lost their jobs).
269. See Matt Egan, How Illinois became America’s Most Messed-Up State,
(July
1,
2017,
8:51
AM),
CNNBUSINESS
https://money.cnn.com/2017/06/29/investing/illinois-budget-crisis-downgrade/index.html
[https://perma.cc/HM3J-X2FP] (explaining Illinois’ low bond rating and pension liabilities
“signals a heightened risk of default”).

2020]

MUNICIPAL BONDS

305

essential services to meet obligations for pension funds. 270 While
politicians are making efforts to close the underfunded pension gap, 271 if
the economy falls into a recession, it is hard to imagine how New Jersey
or Illinois will be able to handle their obligations as cities within the states
are already essentially bankrupt. 272
Defaults have significant
consequences for municipal bond investors, and if municipalities in New
Jersey or Illinois file for bankruptcy, the cumulative effect on the market
could be significant. 273
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Underfunded pensions diminish the safety of investments in
municipal bonds in part because they lead to a lower prioritization for
bondholders should the municipality file for bankruptcy. 274 As pensions
are increasingly underfunded, ratings are lowered for the municipality’s
bonds, 275 creating higher interest rates for any debt issued by the
municipality. 276 The higher interest rate means the municipality’s debt
270. See, e.g., Shields, supra note 102 (explaining that Illinois state mandate to increase
its funding for pensions has caused municipal bond rating downgrades as well as cuts to
essential services).
271. See, e.g., Gregory Pratt, Chicago Mayor Lori Lightfoot Holds Final Budget Town
Hall on City’s $838 Million Shortfall, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-lori-lightfoot-final-chicago-budget-town-hall20191003-pvytdkx4vfahbcbgix2utyos4y-story.html
[https://perma.cc/YF7Q-PLBK]
(outlining Mayor Lightfoot’s budget meeting intended to solve the deficit problem caused
largely by pension obligations).
272. Mennis, Banta & Draine, supra note 83, at 1.
273. See Krantz, supra note 159 (“Detroit’s bankruptcy protection filing is introducing the
word fear to the vocabulary of investors who have sought shelter in the municipal bond
market.”).
274. See Dick, supra note 145, at 77 (“Many chapter 9 debtors have simply chosen to be
more generous to their employees and retirees, even if it requires cramming down a plan that
severely impairs the rights of other creditors.”).
275. See, e.g., Robert Steyer, Moody’s Cuts New Jersey’s Credit Rating on Budget,
Pension Funding Concerns, PENSIONS & INV. (Mar. 28, 2017, 1:00 AM),
https://www.pionline.com/article/20170328/ONLINE/170329882/moody-s-cuts-new-jerseys-credit-rating-on-budget-pension-funding-concerns
[https://perma.cc/R77H-PDJZ]
(“Moody’s Investors Service cut New Jersey’s general obligation bond rating by one notch
due to ‘the continued negative impact of significant pension underfunding, including growth
in the state’s large long-term liabilities, a persistent structural imbalance and weak fund
balances,’ the firm said.”).
276. See, e.g., Karen Pierog, Illinois Hangs on to Low Investment-Grade Credit Rating,
REUTERS (June 4, 2019, 5:22 PM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-illinois-ratings/illinoishangs-on-to-low-investment-grade-credit-rating-from-moodys-idUSKCN1T52VX
[https://perma.cc/5FXT-XBMK] (“The rating, which affects about $30.2 billion of
outstanding debt, remains the lowest among U.S. states at a notch above the junk level due
largely to Illinois’ huge unfunded pension liability and chronic structural budget deficit.”).
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management obligation increases, 277 leaving less state revenue to deal
with the pension shortfall. 278 In turn, a city ends up in a vicious cycle
where its only means to catch up on pension contributions is to raise
revenue with higher taxes or issue more debt. 279 In most cases, cities
increase taxes to raise revenue that provides limited improvement in
tackling the underfunded pension obligations. 280 Tax increases also drive
residents to leave municipalities, resulting in a smaller base from which
to raise revenue. 281 By the time a municipality files for bankruptcy, its
underfunded pension obligation is massive, its crime and tax rate is high,
and its essential services have faced major cuts and setbacks. 282
The bull market has masked both pension insecurities and the
insolvent cities within states. 283 Continued investment returns above 7%
are unlikely as research firms call for a reevaluation of investors’
expected yearly returns in the investment market. 284 With pension funds

277. Balcerzak, supra note 237.
278. Id.
279. See, e.g., Rob Kozlowski, Chicago Mayor Proposes $10 Billion in Bonds to Improve

(Dec.
12,
2018,
12:00
AM),
Pension
Funding,
PENSION & INVS.
https://www.pionline.com/article/20181212/ONLINE/181219858/chicago-mayor-proposes10-billion-in-bonds-to-improve-pension-funding [https://perma.cc/T9XM-A9P9] (explaining
that then-mayor Rahm Emanuel proposed issuing $10 billion in municipal bonds specifically
to improve Chicago’s pension funding); Shayndi Raice & Heather Gillers, Chicago Mayor
Searches for Answers to Gaping Budget Hole, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chicago-mayor-faces-huge-budget-shortfall-11567079128
[https://perma.cc/FV39-6Z3V] (providing that Mayor Lightfoot proposes a variety of
different taxes to ease to underfunded pension gap).
280. See, e.g., Hal Dardick & Juan Perez Jr, Despite Rahm Emanuel’s Tax Hikes. City
Pension Debt Grew by $7 Billion Since 2015. Here’s Why., Chi. Trib. (Oct. 3, 2019, 9:57
AM) https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-chicago-city-pension-fund-growth20191003-tdb6ah5u6vdk7gh3zrn6p65wgu-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6UB4-9M2V]
(explaining that despite a “record-high” property tax increase, a water and sewer tax increase,
and a higher 911 emergency fee pension, deficits have still grown).
281. See supra Part II.A.
282. See, e.g., David Uberti, The Death of a Great American City, THE GUARDIAN (Apr.
3, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/apr/03/the-death-of-a-great-americancity-why-does-anyone-still-live-in-detroit [https://perma.cc/FV39-6Z3V] (explaining the
reasons Detroit failed).
283. See Anthony Mirhaydari, Pension Plans Are in Trouble (and Tt’s Going to Get
wWrse), PITCH BOOK (Nov. 15, 2017), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/pensions-plansare-in-trouble-and-its-going-to-get-worse [https://perma.cc/B56U-UCJS] (“Many public and
corporate pension plans are underfunded, with obligations outpacing assets, despite recently
enjoying one of the greatest, most persistent equity bull markets in history.”).
284. See, e.g., Tim Koller, Mekala Krishnan, & Sree Raaswamy, Bracing for a New Era
of
Lower
Investment
Returns,
MCKINSLEY & COMPANY (July
2016),
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/ourinsights/bracing-for-a-new-era-of-lower-investment-returns [https://perma.cc/J6V7-3F6W]
(“We believe that this golden age is now over and that investors need to brace for an era of
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relying so heavily on investments, if a recession were to occur and the
assumed rate of return for pensions is forced below 5%, the underfunded
portions of the most stressed funds would likely amount to unsustainable
liabilities. 285 Municipalities within underfunded states may be left with
no choice but to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy to restructure debt. 286
Nevertheless, municipal bonds can still be viewed as a positive
investment for individuals because of their tax benefits and yield. 287
They are also useful tool for banks to purchase as assets for liquid capital
purposes as well as income. 288 There are healthy, high-rated municipal
bonds outstanding within states that are managing their pension funds
responsibly. 289 However, the desire for “safe” risk-averse return in a low
interest environment tends to push investors into less safe bonds that net
a higher interest rate. 290 In these cases, investors should monitor the
municipalities in which their investments are issued and follow the states’
pension liabilities and reforms, because credit rating agencies look
closely at a state’s pension health when assessing ratings. 291 Credit
agencies also use a lower discount rate when calculating a state’s total
pension liability; 292 therefore, numbers reported by the pension plan or
media may not reflect the metrics the credit agencies apply. 293 A state
rated a notch or two above investment-grade, like Illinois, is most
vulnerable to a rating change, which would have a large impact on the
pricing and liquidity of its issued bonds. 294
Overall, municipal bond investors should heed the red flags of
past bankruptcies and prepare for a higher default risk if the economy
substantially lower investment returns… [and] project that total real returns in the next 20
years could be between 4.0 and 6.5 percent for US equities . . . .”).
285. Cembalest, supra note 222.
286. Mennis, Banta & Draine, supra note 83 at 3.
287. See Bladridge, supra note 30 (explaining tax-benefits of municipal bonds).
288. See supra Part II.C.
289. See Pension Funding Gap, supra note 84, at 6–7 (explaining states like South Dakota
and North Carolina are managing their pension funds appropriately).
290. See supra Part I.
291. Nolan, supra note 149.
292. See Healey, supra note 227 (explaining credit rating agencies find pension plans have
larger total pension liabilities then the plans report, because they use a smaller discount rate).
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., Karen Pierog, Seller’s Market Seen Aiding Illinois and Chicago Bond
Issues, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2019, 6:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-illinoisbonds/sellers-market-seen-aiding-illinois-and-chicago-bond-issues-idUSKCN1R60ZA
[https://perma.cc/7KVE-BKA4] (“Budget measures, including the use of one-time revenue
and a more than $800 million reduction in contributions to the state’s woefully underfunded
pensions, could push Illinois closer to a junk credit rating.”).
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slows or pension reforms fail to matriculate quickly enough to fix the
massive pension liabilities facing some states and municipalities. 295
JOHN R. FALLON *

295. See Mennis, Banta & Draine, supra note 83, at 2–3 (explaining the future viability of
vulnerable states with exceedingly large pension debts).
*I want to thank my godfather, Andrew C. Pizzo, for his mentorship and support throughout
my academic career and life.

